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THE BEGINNINGS OF PHILOSOPHY IN AUSTRALIA AND THE WORK OF HENRY LAURIE.¹

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I.—THE BEGINNINGS OF PHILOSOPHY IN AUSTRALIA.

THE first presidential address to the members of this Association delivered by our much lamented colleague, Bernard Muscio, was entitled "Our Philosophical Heritage". He eloquently set forth the glories of man's achievement in the world of philosophy and pleaded for an enlargement of Australia's participation in this wonderful inheritance. Though the silver sound of his voice is still, we shall ever hold in remembrance his call and unite together to fulfil the task from which he was withdrawn all too early in his life.

It has fallen to my lot recently to gather together a list² of Australian publications in philosophy, psychology and education, which constitutes the beginning of what we hope to be a worthy Australian contribution (along with that of our New Zealand co-workers) towards a philosophical garner of the Empire. A casual survey of these works may prompt the view that this collection is neither large nor impressive. But it would not be fair to demean its value in this way. It certainly is not an extensive one; and although nearly half of the writers of the more outstanding works have been selected for appointments in Australia and are men who would probably not otherwise have come here, yet it is gratifying to record that the writings of young Australians in the divisions of philosophy and education are becoming more and more prominent; and in view of the enlivening stimulus of such a corporate body of thought as is being developed by this Association, there is ample promise of a good harvest in the near future. We may ask what this amount of work accomplished in philosophical studies really represents, and what from the history and present standing of our nation is to be reasonably expected of Australian thinkers and teachers.

¹ Presidential Address delivered at the Annual Meeting of the Australasian Association of Psychology and Philosophy, Sydney University, May 23, 1929.

² The Bibliography of Philosophy and Psychology appears at the end of the second part of this Address.

It must first of all be admitted that this land of ours is still in the opening stages of its development. We are a scattered community with widely separated centres of activity as represented by the capitals of each State. There are no strong or concentrated bonds of communion or corporate life between the thinkers and scholastic workers of these far-flung centres, and their comparative fewness in number adds to the difficulties of co-operative service. If a gathering of philosophic thinkers were summoned, even assuming the utmost facilities for attendance, the available men and women would not be likely to make a commanding (though it might be a significant) impression. Effort up to the present has been sporadic. But during the past seven years this Association has embarked upon the laudable enterprise of organizing philosophical and similar studies in Australia and New Zealand. And it would not be out of place to record here the splendid services rendered by Bernard Muscio in founding this Association and its Journal, in collaboration with his Sydney colleagues, Emeritus Professor Francis Anderson, Professor H. Tasman Lovell, and Dr. A. H. Martin. When we consider the lateness of the foundation of British philosophical journals as compared with that of Germany, we have done well to follow in their wake at this relatively early period of our own national history. To exist in this Commonwealth of ours the Journal must appeal in diverse ways. But despite this disability, it has maintained a satisfactory standard. Indeed, it has won respect and recognition abroad,¹ and it may be acclaimed as a notable achievement of Australia and New Zealand. Some of the best work done in Australia in the philosophical and psychological sciences is recorded in the pages of the Journal. It is right and proper that Australia and New Zealand should undertake their combined share in moulding the world's thought, and the far-sighted act which led to the publication of this Journal will (I hope), in the course of years, be recognized in a manner similar to the remembrance of Croom Robertson's work in founding the British quarterly "Mind".

Australian workers in these departments of study experience difficulty in finding an outlet for their contributions in journals published in other countries, where the local supply usually exceeds the amount of available space; hence, it is imperative to provide means for the publication of philosophical articles by Australians in their own land. One necessary factor for the development of philosophical ideas (as of ideas in general) is the clash of thinking minds as evidenced in controversy. The Journal provides the forum. This feature has not yet shown itself as prominently as one would desire. Clashes of

¹ *Vide Philosophischer Weltanzeiger*. Ed. by Paul Feldkeller. Schönwalde (Niederbarnim) bei Berlin. Vol. II. No. 5, p. 37.

thought as between leading contestants have been all too infrequent. Perhaps it is due to the fact that our thinkers have not yet grown to independence of standing. They have been all too alike in training and experience; and, mainly reacting to an academical environment, they have not developed into or around schools of thought, sufficiently definite to promote marked differences of outlook eventuating in thought-provoking discussions. But the present time is not without signs that men of opposing doctrines are assuming philosophical leadership in Australia. Their discovery and advancement will give a stronger impetus to studies in the realm of ideas, and awaken a greater volume of original thinking than has been provided hitherto.

It is scarcely fifty years since University instruction in the philosophical disciplines was first inaugurated in Australia, and it is not to be expected that in the very short time which has elapsed any distinctively Australian contribution would be made to philosophy. National distinctiveness in philosophical thought has been the achievement of very few peoples, and these comprise the leading European nations. In this assemblage Australia cannot stand as a separate entity. And from her position and outlook it does not appear likely that Nature will favour us immediately with a fully-equipped independent thinker of first rank in these fields of inquiry. But we must prepare the way. And it should be remembered that great thinkers do not spring suddenly from nowhere; they come out of the mental environment of their day and generation, which is in the line of a great succession. Hence, we do rightly in making exalted in our midst the philosophical heritage of our race; for the creative thought of mankind must become active in our own thinking if we are to accomplish anything of worth. Indeed, it must be so absorbed by us that it shall well up in our very marrow, for only out of such intimacy and at-oneness with the historical development of ideas can we hope to achieve. We must further strive to elicit the dominant ideas leavening the social and moral movements of our own nation's life, and reveal their organic links with the growing spot of advancing thought. And so the ruling influences of the world's best in philosophy are ours for the garnering. But their absorption must not come by mere suction; it must be filtered through the transforming process of a critical understanding. Thus there will arise in us an awakened consciousness of the need of a message to contemporaries, an inner demand for an analysis of the foundations of national life, the stir of a critical estimate of values of conduct, the unravelling of invisible movements of pressure in the mental atmosphere of our time—and indeed the very creation of a new world of thought, as well as the re-interpretation of what has contributed to present-day

contemplation and enjoyment in the realms of art, science and morality.

Here are some of the claimants for the services of Australian thinkers. How far and in what ways the environment actuates the powers of mental struggle for expression it is hard to say. The burning desire for utterance felt as a responsibility that cannot be put down, the persistent surging up within the mind of idea-forces released from the universe of living things, and the compelling demands of competition in thought-production are the stimulating processes, but without corporate association these germinating elements do not seem adequately to function. These conditions our mental *milieu* does not at present supply in the manner and effectiveness which appear to evoke and sustain creative effort in thinking. Production of ideas and their welding into a heritage of thought are not widespread activities with us. These functions are the outpourings of national maturity; and we are as yet a long way from attainment. Our present tasks are to consolidate the foundations of nationhood and prepare the means for the erecting of mansions for the soul of learning. We must needs first acquire the wealth and security that ultimately open the way to free expression of ideas and zest for meditation. Our days of contemplation will yet come; but the time of their appearing is hidden from us. Yet withal we must toil on patiently and persistently. Occasionally an original mind is produced in our midst; but our environing conditions cannot foster it to fruition; and it must go to the ancient foundations of wisdom for animating draughts. We may instance the name of Samuel Alexander who, born in Sydney, received his education at Wesley College and the University of Melbourne, and afterwards migrated to England, where today he is acknowledged as one of the outstanding thinkers of the present generation. An early promise culminated in a commanding achievement. One questions whether Professor Alexander would have come into his own had he been called to University duties in Australia. Still we must not be disconsolate, if for a long time to come our Universities do no more than bear along the highways of learning the torches of the European philosophical schools, for our civilization is integral with that of Western Europe. Like the smaller as well as the new nations of the world we cannot claim to be originally creative in this realm of abstract thought. And it were well that we at least be discriminatively receptive and imbibe from the most invigorating sources; for this is the only way open to us, or indeed to any other nation, if aspirations towards national greatness in thought are deep-seated and genuine. We have but to call to mind the penetrating influence of the towering thinkers of Europe upon our own national development in all

its several bearings in order to convince ourselves how closely allied we are with them in the world of thought. We should rather stress this notion of alliance than raise questions of an inferior station, which would indeed be foolish under the circumstances. Truly a magnificent opportunity is presented to us, and our greatness will be determined in accordance with the measure in which we embrace it.

Our own immediate task is to grapple at first hand with the untamed forces of our physical environment. We call, as we have ever done, for more and more volunteers from overseas. We are not yet a nation that can replenish itself from within. We still react as a migrant people, looking without for the powers that sustain and advance community growth. We have not reached the stage where we are the masters of our own domain, relying upon ourselves for the man-power to carry out schemes of progress, whether material or cultural, which we have determined by means of a corporate leadership initiated from within. We cannot command services, if it can be put in that way without being misunderstood; we must yet seek and plead for what comes to us. To admit all this is not to stultify ourselves, to demean anything we have achieved, or to speak in derogatory terms of our advancement in nationhood. We are still in the making. We are not sufficiently natured to set tasks for ourselves; we must needs conform to the tasks which are set for us. But our period of tutelage must inevitably pass. And we shall ere long be in a position to tempt, aye to claim, by an inherent right of greatness, the superior ones in the Commonwealth of knowledge and culture. At the same time we may truly pride ourselves on the fact that as a nation we have contributed our quota (small as it must necessarily be) of scholars and scientists to the great centres of the world's activity of thought, and that they are able to hold their seats securely among the most famous. They have been appraised at a world value, and so do not remain with us.

The first teachers and writers of philosophy in Australian Universities (Henry Laurie, Francis Anderson, and William Mitchell) came from Scotland's seats of learning, with which several of the later generation of Australian philosophical thinkers have had intimate associations, either by means of personal contact or fruitful instruction and interchange of thought. Scottish philosophy, whether through the "common sense" tradition of Reid and the later realists or the ethical idealism of Campbell Fraser and Pringle-Pattison, or through the neo-Kantian and Hegelian influences of the Cairds, has exercised a marked bearing upon the development of philosophical thought in Australia. This idealistic trend, despite its varying phases, has been most penetrating as against

empirical or naturalistic doctrines. The dominance of idealism has been accentuated through recent contact with the activism of Eucken and the intuitionism of Bergson among several of the later representative teachers in our Universities. The liberalizing influences of these thinkers upon the social life of our time, associated with the energizing will-to-believe and will-to-act of the personalistic and pragmatic schools, have left deep traces in quarters not directly linked up with the University tradition, and notably in one of our great political leaders, Alfred Deakin, who openly preferred the philosophical life before politics, and whose friendship with Josiah Royce, and whose affiliations with thinkers imbued with decidedly practical leanings, remained with him as a source of inward strength and mental power. The adherence to idealism in some form or other in opposition to naturalism and materialism on the part of philosophical thinkers in Australia is a highly significant fact when viewed in relation to the great effort of a small population to grapple with the material resources of an immense unsubdued Continent. Of course, it must be admitted that all shades of philosophical opinions and doctrines find a place here in Australia as in any other land, but all these variations add colour or nuance to the prevailing trends which have been undoubtedly strong in the idealistic direction. It is not desired, by any means, to leave the impression that naturalism or materialism in philosophy is inimical to national advancement or springs from immaturity or decadence. But it has never stood alone in the forefront of philosophical development; and where it has appeared to do so, it has rather been as a foil to idealism than as a power of independent standing. Behind it there ever lurks a background of idealistic presuppositions.

It would be expected that in a new land greater strides would be made in scientific studies than in the distinctively philosophical. The demands of the environment are insistent and force man to reckon immediately with what vitally affects his needs and satisfactions. He must improve or open up territories that promise wealth, render easier the effort to live, and unite increased numbers of newcomers. But assurance for the attainment of these objectives must be directly given and adequately guaranteed. The sciences are accordingly called in to aid these great national enterprises. Man must first provide himself with the security of subsistence and enjoyment, before he can free himself from the stress and strain of livelihood in order to reflect in the abstract on all that he has accomplished or desires to aim at. And so it is not to be wondered at that Australian achievements in the positive sciences have appeared earlier than original contributions to philosophy. And we know that the United States of America waited a long time for the coming of James, Royce and Dewey, who are arrivals of quite a recent date.

The philosophical books which have been written by Australians are mainly critical or expository in character, being studies of the works of eminent European thinkers. They are contributions of no mean merit in their respective provinces, and, though critico-expository in treatment, are not without constructive features which show that the writers have definite philosophical predilections and are capable of independent construction. In psychology there are indications that Australians are not neglectful of the claims which the world makes upon them for contributions, both theoretical and experimental, in view of the highly homogeneous character of our nation. And although the amount of published work in this field is comparatively small, yet something of value has been achieved ; and with increasing support to the Departments of Psychology in the Universities, we may expect results worthy of the virile mentality of the people of the Commonwealth.¹ It may be proper to make mention here of the painstaking labour embodied in Alexander Sutherland's "Origin and Growth of the Moral Instinct" (1898). He seeks to trace the moral instinct from its earliest beginnings in the needs of animal life, and its development in an unbroken continuity from the lowliest savage to civilized man—progressing at first "with inexpressible slowness, but imperceptibly quickening as it advances", until it becomes "the noblest feature as yet visible on this ancient earth of ours". He is specially concerned with the growth of the sympathetic emotion (associated with parental care), from which there emerges "the moral instinct with all its accompanying accessories, the sense of duty, the feeling of self-respect, the enthusiasm of both the tender and the manly ideal of ethic beauty". Although we cannot accept his presentation of sympathy as natural morality and his explanation of morality as arising out of non-moral elements, yet we must pay a tribute to Sutherland's splendid effort to apply the theory of evolution to moral development. Professor William McDougall refers to his work with respect ; and his array of facts and illustrative material are invaluable for social psychology. When we consider the recency of attempts to tackle seriously the analysis of the primary emotions and instincts, we may take pride in the fact that this phase of psychology had an early exponent in Australia.

The beginnings of philosophical studies in Australia² mainly concern the pioneering work of the early occupants of

¹ For an account of psychological teaching in Australian and New Zealand Universities, see Dr. A. H. Martin's article in this Journal, "The Present Status of Psychology" (Vol. III, 1925, pp. 40-51).

² The first published book on philosophy in Australia was probably the work of the Rev. Barzillai Quaife, entitled "Intellectual Sciences: Outline Lectures delivered chiefly at the Australian College, 1850-51," 2 vol., Gibbs Shallard, Sydney, 1872. These lectures were mainly based upon the philosophy of Sir William Hamilton. The Australian College was founded by the Rev. John Dunmore Lang in 1831.

our Chairs of Philosophy. The first Australian Professor of Philosophy was the late Henry Laurie (1838-1922), who, after holding a lectureship for four years, was elevated to the new Melbourne Chair of Mental and Moral Philosophy in 1886, retiring in 1911. He was followed by Francis Anderson at Sydney (Lecturer 1888 and Professor 1890-1921) and William Mitchell at Adelaide (1894-1923). The Australian Universities were most fortunate in these original appointments¹; and although the three Professors received their training in neighbouring institutions in Scotland, they were not stereotyped products. Each of them developed along his own lines, and added a distinctive feature to the courses of philosophical studies in his own department. After a meagre mention of the spheres of action of William Mitchell and Francis Anderson, which must eventually be more elaborately treated by abler hands, I shall pass on to a somewhat more detailed account of the teachings of Henry Laurie, whose death in 1922 was briefly noticed in the first issue of our Journal.

In his exemplary work on the "Structure and the Growth of the Mind" (1907), Sir William Mitchell has set a high standard. It is worthy of ranking alongside the productions of such men as Ward and Stout. In this book he throws light upon many difficult mental processes which do not appear to advantage in the ordinary run of psychological textbooks. He opens with a skilful analysis of the framework of experience, distinguishing between "thought", "thinking", and "thought about"; and then proceeds to handle with consummate ease such delicate problems as the transition from sensory to perceptual and to conceptual levels of experience, and the function of taken-for-granted in the courses of both perceiving and conceiving. His discussions of what is involved in individuation, and particularly of what and how we experience when absorbed in an object, as well as of the nature of implicit and explicit thought, are more adequately treated than in most other books. His work as a whole unravels the structure and functioning of the thinking process with the deftness of an accomplished craftsman. And his illustrative

¹ Prior to the above-mentioned separate appointments, philosophical studies were associated with other Chairs, the occupants of which merely "directed" them. In Sydney, e.g., Logic was linked with Classics. In Adelaide, from the foundation of the University in 1874 until the appointment of Professor Mitchell, philosophy was linked with English under the combined title of "English Language and Literature and Mental and Moral Philosophy". The previous holders of the joint Chair were not expected to specialize in philosophy. In connection with the first recognition of philosophy as a separate department of study in the University of Melbourne, it is of interest to record two articles by Henry Laurie in which he urged that "philosophy was entitled to a place in a liberal education". The first on a "Plea for Philosophy" appeared in the *Victorian Review* (Vol. 5, November, 1881, pp. 76-89), prior to his own appointment as Lecturer in Logic. The second on the "Study of Mental Philosophy" was a lecture delivered to his class on March 24, 1885, and published in the *Melbourne Review* (Vol. 10, 1885, pp. 185-195). In 1882 a similar appeal for the recognition of philosophy was made in the *Sydney University Review* (1882, pp. 195-206) under the title of a "Plea for the Study of Philosophy" by J.B.N.

material is of inestimable value to the artist, teacher and writer. This is truly a work which sheds lustre on philosophical teaching in our Australian Universities.

I would fain remain here and give an extended account of Sir William Mitchell's treatment of mind. Mental activity for him is central in experience. Action of mind is always action on an occasion—an action which develops the occasion. The whole of mind (or the self) is not involved at any one time—only the activity of it called forth on the occasion. Experience is, then, "what the mind does in reaction to its environment". It is conditioned by the occasion or stimulus (which may be a mental or physical object) and the reacting structure (which is the mind itself). There are physical and physiological conditions of experience which are not directly known (but can come to be known). But what we directly know is the mind making and having the experience. "All experience is experience of self, now of this and now of that faculty. . . . It is our own self working. But the working is neither self nor faculty. It is a process due to them, but they are not a process, not an experience." Faculty means for Mitchell the power to produce, or the capacity for, an experience. It is the power of mental reaction as distinct from the occasion, and the faculty is usually named after what it produces. In experience there is differentiation of subject and object. This distinction is "not an experience of difference between two objects of experience". It results from the "analysis of experience into two factors in relation". Experience itself would be impossible without either. Nor are they separately opposed; nor can we, as it were, pass or infer from one to the other as self-subsistent factors. In his general analysis of experience, Mitchell clearly sets forth the three attitudes of thought, interest and action; and each of them implies the self experiencing an object, which, as self-activity, is the fundamental category of psychology. "No experience is only of what we set before us, but of the setting or thinking as well as that which we do not set before us." Hence, all experience is self-activity. In his unravelling of the delicate patterns of the structure of experience (as thought), Mitchell ably justifies the claims of psychology to make a direct explanation in terms of its own categories. Sir William Mitchell appears to glory in the marvellous endowment of the human mind. And in this connection we all await with eagerness the publication of the two series of his Gifford lectures on the "Place of Minds" and the "Power of Minds"; and would congratulate him, not only for himself, but also for the great distinction which he has thus conferred upon philosophical teaching in Australia. In his handling of philosophy he is an

excellent example of the thinker who can delve among abstractions and reveal them as living powers in human enterprise and achievement. For him philosophy is not detached from life, and his accomplishment as a University administrator is a fitting consummation of his own instruction in the classroom.

And now a brief remark on Professor Francis Anderson. During his long occupancy of the first Chair of Philosophy in the University of Sydney he impressed his personality indelibly upon the development of philosophical and psychological teaching in Australia. Many of his students still hold high positions in the Universities, devoting themselves to the ideals of service which he inculcated with unrelaxing vigour. His personal strength still grips the steering wheel. He was an inspirer of youth to action in the interests of daring and adventure. He insisted that there must be no "self-set limits" to effort. He led men to the fountain-heads of wisdom, not to sit down and contemplate, but to become bearers of the torch and reclaim the failures of the past. Service along with him was an inspiration to service. He was no doctrinaire; shibboleths were anathema to him; the shackling of thought was for him the tragedy of the ages. His was an unshrinking faith in the truth that makes men free. The thinker must be an explorer, a discoverer; and he must fearlessly advance into the unknown, preserving untarnished his confidence in the illimitable unfolding of God's truth in man's nature.

Anderson's passionate investigations of the political, social and religious institutions, revealed an enthusiasm in inquiry characteristic of the virile thinkers who found in philosophy the revelation of a living universe in every moment of its being. But he never lost his hold on the trustworthiness of intelligence and its capacity to progress. And this trait he evinced in his philosophical analysis of man's social and moral development. And the highest expression of intelligence he found in personality, which constitutes the ultimate end of life. Institutions may come and go; civilizations may rise and perish in oblivion; but personality—the civilizing principle which operates through all the changes of the centuries—remains. Its full nature he avers is only shown in its development. "It reveals new possibilities in the process of its application. It awakens new powers and creates new duties." The real end of human progress remains "personality and the promotion of personality, the full and free development of the activities of man as a moral and spiritual being". Full of fire himself, Anderson knew well the power of emotion to stir men to achievement, but he knew also that if "an emotion is to endure and have a permanent effect on life, it must expand into a principle; and it could not do so if it were not also a

principle in germ". Thus in his fervent and indefatigable pleadings for the study of sociology, he rooted his ardour in reasoned conviction. In season and out of season he argued for the teaching of the science of society in a land where the material for investigation lay about in abundance. And without waiting for the creation of a separate Chair for its study, he opened out with his own courses of lectures on social and political philosophy, dealing with the theory of the State, social movements, and the origin and growth of human institutions, and in them he made a distinctive feature of the psychological and ethical implications of institutional progress. His scholarly work in this field deserves publication in a more fitting form than he has yet given it. Though he was not fortunate enough to persuade authorities to establish a new department of sociology, he later succeeded in having set up a separate household for psychology, and thus enabled the University of Sydney to outstrip the other Australian Universities in the modern handling of this important science. Though he is not now in active service, Professor Francis Anderson's work cannot yet be regarded as completed, and the impress of his personal influence is still felt in our midst.

We may fittingly associate with these three early teachers our second President, Professor W. R. Boyce Gibson, of Melbourne (appointed 1911), who, though of almost the same generation, is still actively engaged, and whose spiritualistic philosophy, inspired by the activism of Eucken, has proved a strong stimulating force in the Universities. The fervour of his ethical thought and his pure-hearted stand for personal idealism have exalted one's faith in the worth of philosophical discipline, whether one accepts the doctrines or not; and Australian thought has been amply enriched by his strenuous example and devoted zeal. And, finally, it would be an ungrateful omission, if I closed this section of my address without a passing reference to the many able contributions to experimental and applied psychology made by Bernard Muscio. He was one who also excelled in philosophy, and it is an unfortunate circumstance that he was not permitted to complete his life's work, which even in its early stages won for him a well-deserved recognition abroad. His sympathies with critical realism would have enabled him to open wide the door to a new influence in the philosophical thought of this land, and it is most likely that some of his students will, as they mature, reflect the main trends of his teaching. And it is now to the younger generation that we must look to delve into the depths of experience, and reveal to the world the characteristic currents of the thought which a new and virile nation has released from contact with Nature in an almost pristine setting.

[To be continued.]

BRITISH ETHICAL THEORIES: THE PLACE AND IMPORTANCE OF BISHOP BUTLER.

By W. M. KYLE, M.A.,

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IN the period between the publication of *Leviathan* (1651) and the appearance of Locke's *Essay* and *Two Treatises of Government* (1690) Thomas Hobbes dominated the whole field of English philosophical and political speculation, and it was not until Hume introduced the "experimental method of reasoning into moral subjects" in his *Treatise of Human Nature* (1739-40) that his potent influence on ethical thought was in any way diminished. Hobbes' writings provoked vigorous and unsparing criticism. In tract and pamphlet his "notorious errors" were confuted and "due correction" administered. His political opponents determined to "catch the great Whale" or "draw Leviathan out with a hook"; in fact, they were mostly too busy refuting Hobbes to acknowledge their obligations to him. Alike to moralists and to theologians he represented all that was evil: "Against Hobbes", said Warburton, "the whole Church militant took up arms. The answers to the *Leviathan* would form a library."⁽¹⁾ But his critics were not all detractors; many made lasting contributions to philosophy. The Cambridge Platonists offered the earliest constructive criticism. Influenced in a more or less negative fashion by the new thought of Descartes, which Henry More, for instance, warmly welcomed as opposed to atheism but could not accept,⁽²⁾ these men went direct to Hobbes' mechanical first principles and to the psychology that was raised on them and, by their insistence upon the essential and unchangeable natures of things, comprehensible only in so far as they could be regarded as an intellectual whole or system,⁽³⁾ were able to maintain the existence of God and the Soul, the reality of Goodness and a fixed moral standard, and the spontaneity of the practical reason. But it is to ethics that we must look for that reaction against naturalism and the "low" view of human nature that was the starting-point of the idealist tradition which stood strongly through two centuries against the scepticism of Hume and the utilitarian morality; for in English thought interest has manifested itself not so much in "deep" metaphysics, as in the plain facts of experience and the practical conduct of man. Cudworth and Clarke from the side of reason, Shaftesbury and Hutcheson from that of feeling, endeavoured to establish the truths of morality as independent of human will and opinion, and contended that social and moral elements were as original in man's make-up

as purely individual self-regard. But whether this writer or that maintained the independent nature of moral truths or the social impulses in man, all were simply intuitionists ranged against Hobbes. This paper will deal with the final expression of this reaction in Butler's *Sermons* (1726). He it was that based morality on the observed facts of human nature. While agreeing with Hobbes that the springs of moral action originate in man, Butler objects to his analysis as egoistic and false. Self-regarding impulses are not the ultimate forces that shape our destiny. The principles of morality are found in social activities. Man is "made" for social life and "to do good to his fellows", and society is not artificial but "natural".⁽⁴⁾ In the history of ethical thought in England, so far at least as the question of the source of moral action is concerned, Butler stands closer to Hobbes than to Cudworth and Clarke. It is necessary now to consider his place and importance.

According to Hobbes, humanity is a mere collection of individuals, every one inherently selfish and grasping, their natural desires being kept in subjection by fear alone. Society is arbitrary, morality a matter of convention. The only justification of reason is that through it man comes to realize that moral or social living is the only alternative to the war of all against all. It can be said for the English intuitionists, and especially Butler, that they did emphasize certain aspects of human nature which Hobbes had entirely disregarded. But their great defect is that they did not make a systematic examination of the facts of experience before enunciating their theories. They simply contradicted Hobbes or maintained the contrary, and frequently they misrepresented him. Butler's addition to self-love of the natural qualities of benevolence and conscience (or moral reason) raised the question whether in explanation of human conduct attention should be directed towards "reasonable self-love" or towards benevolence, but this could not be determined in any objective manner. So in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries ethical thought in England largely expressed the writer's particular preference or experience of life rather than the results of careful investigation of the facts of consciousness. Not until the time of T. H. Green was experience actually made the ultimate term of explanation and adhered to.

We may briefly summarize the replies to Hobbes of Cudworth and Clarke. Their main thesis was that the truths of morality are the same for all and cannot be altered by the will of man or by compacts between a number of men. Altruistic endeavour is as fundamental a feature of human nature as selfishness. Reason is the source of all knowledge, sensory, scientific or moral. So far no distinction is drawn between pure and practical reason.

There is a close connection between these doctrines and those of Butler. Although Cudworth's *Treatise concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality*, written before 1688, was not printed until 1731, five years after the *Sermons*, its late appearance added nothing that was unknown of the moral teachings of the Cambridge men. Henry More had published his *Enchiridion Ethicum* (1667) in Latin, so that it could not possibly interfere with Cudworth's "designe" for a discourse "concerning Good and Evil, or Natural Ethicks", which he had in mind in 1664 or 1665.⁽⁵⁾ John Smith, the Christian Platonist,⁽⁶⁾ and Nathanael Culverwel,⁽⁷⁾ the other important members of the group, had written before 1650. Butler shows evidences of careful study of these writings. It was through his correspondent and, later, intimate friend Samuel Clarke, Rector of St. James', Westminster, that Butler first interested himself in theology and metaphysics. While still a student at a dissenters' academy at Tewkesbury, where he was being trained for the ministry of the Presbyterian Church, he wrote to Clarke, then at Norwich, questioning the reasoning of certain propositions of the *Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God*⁽⁸⁾ which had recently been published and was attracting some attention. In the opinion of Mackintosh, Butler's objections were really insuperable and "are marked by an acuteness which neither himself nor any other ever surpassed". Apparently Butler was anxious to come into agreement with Clarke; at any rate, the views he expressed then have no part in his later thought.⁽⁹⁾ About this time he conformed to the Established Church and entered Oriel College, Oxford, where he met Edward Talbot, son of the Bishop of Durham and nephew of the Lord Chancellor. His friendship with Clarke and the Talbots led to his appointment in 1718 as preacher at the Chapel of the Rolls Court, where he delivered his *Sermons*, and afterwards to his presentation to the rich living of Stanhope, in the quiet of which he worked at the *Analogy*. For a time he was Chaplain to Queen Caroline, who affected theology and believed that she could appreciate metaphysical discussion, and on her recommendation was made Bishop of Bristol and Dean of St. Paul's. George II offered Butler the primacy, which he declined. Two years before his death in 1752 he became Bishop of Durham. He was wafted to the see of Durham, said the sneering Walpole, in a cloud of metaphysics, and remained absorbed in it.

It is remarkable that Butler's writings produced no contemporary criticism. One single pamphlet appeared attacking the *Analogy*. Richard Price and Henry Home mention minor points in the *Sermons*, but one calls him an "incomparable", the other a "manly and acute", writer. Though he seldom refers to others, he was well read in the

philosophy of his day and, as a thinker, stood in close contact with life. Cudworth had established the dependence of the "eternal and immutable" truths of morality on the wisdom of God: ". . . it is not possible that there should be any such Thing as Morality, unless there be a God, that is, an Infinite Eternal Mind that is the first Original and Source of all Things, whose nature is the first Rule and Exemplar of Morality; for otherwise it is not conceivable whence any such thing should be derived to particular Intellectual Beings."⁽¹⁰⁾ Clarke's conception of a world of moral relations, analogous in some sense to the physical universe, in which the "necessary and eternal different relations" themselves determine the "fitness" or "suitableness" of actions, enabled him to indicate the moral aspect of reality as something apparent to the understanding of all intelligent beings; the "eternal moral obligations" express the will of God to His creatures.⁽¹¹⁾ These doctrines appear again in Butler. Cudworth and Clarke, however, were not content, like Cumberland⁽¹²⁾ before them, to attack Hobbes on his own ground, but built up their systems on entirely new foundations. Now abstract speculation did not appeal to Butler, who found himself more at home in the domain of human conduct and experience. While admitting the validity of the *a priori* method of Clarke, he nevertheless made his own method inductive and psychological. He sought to base morality, so far as it can be considered apart from revealed religion, on the observed facts of human behaviour. Assuming at the outset that human nature is essentially constituted for the achievement of some purpose, he studied it in order to discover the nature of human purposes in the true sense. In this he presupposed that the pursuit of a high purpose is the essential of moral living and happiness.

This view of the purposive nature of things and of man was held by Shaftesbury. Human nature, he believes, is capable of becoming a systematic unity characterized by harmony and proportion. The goodness of an individual (*i.e.*, virtue) is relative to the system of which he is a part: ". . . there can be no particular Being or System which is not either good or ill in that *general one* of the Universe"; and an individual "only is supposed *Good*, when the Good or Ill of the System to which he has relation is the immediate Object of some Passion or Affection moving him".⁽¹³⁾ Butler's conception of "the inward frame of man" as a "*system or constitution*" not only enables him to refute the selfish morality of Hobbes, but also to point with confidence to the truth that man's nature is adapted to virtue.⁽¹⁴⁾ It is the spiritual principle of conscience which constitutes the system of man's nature and prompts him to virtue. With Shaftesbury, virtue

is harmony within the system of the affections, a "balance" between self-regarding and other regarding sentiments. Butler shows that Shaftesbury neglects the authority of conscience in this regard; to ignore the natural supremacy of conscience is to act contrary to our nature.⁽¹⁵⁾

The main doctrines of intuitionism then appear anew in the Sermons on Human Nature. Cudworth and Clarke had sought for the fountain of moral sentiments in reason, Shaftesbury and Hutcheson found them in the heart of man. Shaftesbury had attained remarkable popularity in his day, while the generous enthusiasm of Hutcheson laid the foundations of a new method of education and a new school of thought in Scotland. Only one writer, Mandeville, in his disapproval of Shaftesbury's optimism, reverted to the defiant doctrines of Hobbes for the basis of his fashionably cynical theories of virtue. "The reward of a virtuous action, which is the satisfaction that ensues from it", he wrote, "consists in a certain pleasure (an individual) procures to himself by contemplating on his own worth"; in other words, pride is "so inseparable from his very essence" that man attains to virtue by gratifying it.⁽¹⁶⁾ This is Hobbesism at its worst, and led to sharp replies by Hutcheson, Berkeley, Adam Smith and William Law. It is interesting to notice in passing that *Gulliver's Travels*, in which Swift poured out his scorn of human nature, appeared in the same year as Butler's *Sermons* (1726); Mandeville's final edition of *The Fable of the Bees* is dated 1723; Hutcheson returned to Glasgow as Professor of Moral Philosophy in 1729. It is well that Swift and Mandeville found only readers and not disciples. Mandeville at least could be offensive enough in his exposure of hypocrisy.

There are two doctrines in the Sermons on Human Nature that make up the sum of Butler's teachings: (i) the social nature of man; (ii) his doctrine of conscience. The *first*, really a reply to Hobbes' selfish and individualistic theories, is contained in Sermon I. Human nature is made up of instincts and capacities which find their exercise in social life; ". . . there are as real and the same kind of indications in human nature, that we were made for society and to do good to our fellow-creatures; as that we were intended to take care of our own life and health and private good: . . ." These active principles are (a) Self-love, tending to our own good, and Benevolence, to the good of society; (b) Particular Passions and Affections, "distinct both from benevolence and self-love", designed to secure the special needs of the creature; and (c) Conscience, the highest principle of action, the special task of which is to regulate and secure harmony between the different active principles.

The passions and affections, no less than benevolence and self-love, "contribute and lead us to *public* good as really as to *private*". Particular desires then are not modes or forms of self-love, as Hobbes maintains;⁽¹⁷⁾ they find their satisfaction in objects and are strictly disinterested. Butler has shown that desire is not for pleasure but for objects. Man does not act to secure his own pleasure, but for the achievement of some purpose; the pleasure of the search or effort has often disappeared before the end is reached. Here we find the first definite opposition to, and true criticism of, hedonism. We never act—unless we do so deliberately, having first chosen self-interest as our motive—merely in order to secure pleasure or power for ourselves; we have always some objective end in view. In this way Butler contends that regard for the good of others, *i.e.*, benevolence, is an active principle of human nature; it is not more strange that man should seek the good of others than that he should feel hunger or compassion or resentment. Butler's conclusion that the particular passions are disinterested and lead sometimes to one's own good, sometimes to the good of others, is his most original contribution to the psychology of morality.⁽¹⁸⁾ It is the truth that man does not live merely to gratify primitive impulse. His instincts and intelligence are not only springs of action, but spurs towards ideals. The individual is driven on by the energy within him to new interests and to new tasks, and it is his endeavour, consciously and of set purpose, to develop and harmonize his various instinctive capacities in the service of man and of society. With Butler, self-love is designed to regulate the particular passions and to secure harmony amongst them in order that the realization of his capacities and appetites may be made to contribute to the complete good of the individual throughout his own life. So long as it is reasonable it is superior to any particular passion—" . . . if we will act conformably to the economy of man's nature, reasonable self-love must govern". If men will not act with "reasonable concern for themselves . . . self-love is prevailed over by passion and appetite", *i.e.*, action is unnatural and self-love unreasonable, when it destroys itself.⁽¹⁹⁾ The relation of the two principles of benevolence and self-love is discussed by Butler in Sermons XI and XII: Upon the Love of our Neighbour.

Second: Conscience, or the moral reason, is a principle of reflection and possesses supreme authority in regulating conduct. "There is a superior principle of reflection or conscience in every man, which distinguishes between the internal principles of his heart, as well as his external actions; which passes judgment upon himself and them; pronounces determinately some actions to be in themselves just, right,

good ; others to be in themselves evil, wrong, unjust. . . . It is by this faculty, natural to man, that he is a moral agent, that he is a law to himself " ; and this faculty is " in kind and in nature supreme over all others " and " bears its own authority of being so ".⁽²⁰⁾ This is something considerably different from what Shaftesbury meant by " moral sense ", i.e., " a natural sense of right and wrong ", an intuitive perception analogous to the æsthetic perception of the distinction between beautiful and ugly things. Hutcheson made the moral sense a passive faculty, but under Butler's influence tended to alter its function to one of active approbation or disapproval of right or of wrong, i.e., no longer a mere sensation or feeling.⁽²¹⁾ Although both writers sought to explain the moral sense as due to the nature of man as a social being, neither accepted it as a sufficient basis for morality ; hence, they were unable to endow it with supreme authority over all our actions. The moral sense theory is one of the source, and not the worth, of moral acts. Butler described morality in terms of the authority of conscience which has power to review all our actions and pass judgment upon them. " Had it strength, as it has right ; had it power, as it has manifest authority ; it would absolutely govern the world." In the *Dissertation on Virtue*, published with the *Analogy* in 1736, Butler, probably under the influence of Hutcheson, went beyond his more or less rationalistic position in the *Sermons*,⁽²²⁾ and defined conscience as " moral reason, moral sense, or divine reason ; whether considered as a sentiment of the understanding, or as a perception of the heart ; or which seems the truth, as including both ". We cannot " form a notion of this faculty, conscience, without taking in judgment, direction, superintendency " ; in other words, the claim to rule with authority is the very essence of conscience⁽²³⁾—a point overlooked by Shaftesbury.

Conscience may delegate its authority to " reasonable self-love ", but it also enjoins special duties on society which may not be directly enjoined by self-love. Even though it has supreme authority over particular impulses and affections, being dependent upon these, and only regulative or directive, conscience cannot of itself always exert a force proportional to its supreme authority. It is a principle of reflection by which man " approves or disapproves his heart, temper, and actions ". Reason alone is not a sufficient motive to virtue. Although for Butler conscience is reason, he did not identify pure and practical reason, as did the intuitionists before Hutcheson ; nevertheless, he drew no clear distinction between them, like Kant, although the distinction is implied in his doctrine of conscience.

Conscience, then, is supreme among the powers of the soul. The constitution of human nature gives rules of virtue and creates an obligation to obey them; whence man, having in his make-up principles lower and supreme, "is in the strictest and most proper sense a law to himself" and "hath the rule of right within".⁽²⁴⁾ This theory is conditioned in some part by Butler's religious beliefs. The dictates of conscience are to him the voice of God, the laws of eternal justice manifested in the individual.⁽²⁵⁾ In Sermons XIII and XIV: On the Love of God, the connection between morality and religion is made clear.⁽²⁶⁾ The qualities of justice, goodness and righteousness, as objects of our contemplation, inspire within us reverence, awe and love; seen in God, where they are raised to their highest point, they inspire devout reverence and the warmest love. Between the attributes of God and our holiest and most virtuous feelings "there is as real a correspondence as between the lowest appetite of sense and its object. . . . As the whole attention of life should be to obey his commands; so the highest enjoyment of it must arise from the contemplation of (his) character, and our relation to it, from a consciousness of his favour and approbation, and from the exercise of those affections towards him which could not but be raised from his presence."⁽²⁷⁾

The law of conscience is in conformity with that of self-love. But although duty and interest, *i.e.*, happiness and satisfaction, are seldom inconsistent in this life, the harmony between them may not be complete unless the future life is taken into account. "Self-love, though confined to the interest of the present world, does in general perfectly coincide with virtue; and leads us to one and the same course of life". None the less, we are under a strict obligation to obey conscience, as the law of our nature, quite apart from all considerations of reward and punishment. This emphasis on a moral obligation over and above self-interest suggests the Kantian doctrine of morality as categorical and imperative. Occasionally however, Butler seems to admit to self-love an authority equal to that of conscience; at any rate, although self-love is theoretically taken to be subordinate to conscience, he treats them practically as two independent principles, co-ordinate in authority. "Reasonable self-love and conscience are the chief or superior principles in the nature of man: because an action may be suitable to this nature, though all other principles be violated; but becomes unsuitable, if either of those are."⁽²⁸⁾ Still, Butler could hardly mean that self-love was a judicial faculty. What he probably was maintaining is that conscience is the supreme principle in our nature, having authority over the commands of self-love; but at the same time man cannot reasonably justify to himself any actions that are contrary to his own

nature, *i.e.*, the supremacy of conscience may yield to self-love. "Let it be allowed, though virtue or moral rectitude does indeed consist in affection to and pursuit of what is right and good, as such; yet that when we sit down in a cool hour, we can neither justify to ourselves this or any other pursuit, till we are convinced that it will be for our happiness, or at least not contrary to it."⁽²⁹⁾ Although Butler does seem to imply in this assertion that self-love is the final arbiter of action, he certainly believes, in his insistence upon the authority of conscience, that he has corrected Shaftesbury's view that "virtue and interest may be found at last to agree";⁽³⁰⁾ and further, he holds that benevolence, enjoined as it is by the spirit and facts of the Gospel, is not interfered with by that desire for happiness (*i.e.*, self-love) which is natural to man.⁽³¹⁾ If there is any contradiction implied in Butler's doctrine in this place it may be resolved if it can be shown (a) that actions approved by self-love and conscience are necessarily coincident, and (b) that they are really identical virtues. Butler assents to both these propositions: "Conscience and self-love, if we understand our true happiness, always lead us the same way. Duty and interest are perfectly coincident; for the most part in this world, but entirely and in every instance, if we take in the future, and the whole; this being implied in the notion of a good and perfect administration of things. Thus they who have been so wise in their generation as to regard only their own supposed interest, at the expense and to the injury of others, shall at last find, that he who has given up all the advantages of the present world, rather than violate his conscience and the relations of life, has infinitely better provided for himself, and secured his own interest and happiness."⁽³²⁾

There are in the *Sermons* two interesting doctrines which were developed later by rival moralists—the authoritative nature of conscience, suggestive of Kant's categorical imperative, and second, the social nature of motive, which points directly to John Stuart Mill. And although these thinkers cannot be said to have taken their doctrines from the writings of Butler, the fact that we find him anticipating them shows the important place he fills in the history of ethics.⁽³³⁾ He impresses upon us the obligations to duty and, in emphasizing the existence of disinterested feelings and of a "desire to do what is right and reasonable", inculcates what Kant called a "respect" for the moral law. This championship of disinterested virtues also modified the hedonism of Henry Sidgwick. Butler's system, however, is not a complete ethic. It was sufficient for him, it would appear, to justify his belief that man is adapted to virtue; he did not raise the question of the nature of conscience or of its relation to reason or to will. His influence upon the morals of later days is slight. In the latter part

of the eighteenth century he was overshadowed by Paley and in the nineteenth by the Utilitarians. Few able writers attacked him; of his adverse critics Leslie Stephen was the fairest and most skilful. Mackintosh found no errors, though a few defects, in his principles. Reid and Dugald Stewart of the Scottish School show traces of his teachings. Hastings Rashdall, who fully appreciated the work of Butler, asserts the superiority even to Kant of his account of virtue and happiness.⁽³⁴⁾ Finally, to read his ethical writings together with the *Review of the Principal Questions . . . in Morale* (1757), by Richard Price, is to gain an adequate conception of typically English Ethics.⁽³⁵⁾

REFERENCES.

- (1) Quoted from Mackintosh: *Ethical Philosophy*.
- (2) More corresponded with Descartes, 1648-50; see Sorley: *British Philosophy*, pp. 78-80, and Mullinger: *History of Cambridge*, pp. 606-8. Descartes was first introduced into Cambridge by John Allsopp, a fellow of Christ's, early in the seventeenth century.
- (3) Strictly true of Cudworth.
- (4) Sermon I.
- (5) Letter from Cudworth to John Worthington, January, 1664-65. Cudworth may have been referring to a MS. never printed or to *Et. and Immut. Morality*. In the *Analogy*, Butler frequently reminds us of Cudworth.
- (6) *Select Discourses*, pub. posth. 1660.
- (7) *Light of Nature*, pub. posth. 1652.
- (8) Boyle Lectures, 1704 (pub. 1705). For the Letters, see Gladstone's edition of Butler's Works.
- (9) The propositions objected to were the sixth, on "the infinity or omnipresence" of God, and the seventh, that a self-existing Being "must of necessity be one". Butler refers to the unity of God in the *Analogy*, Pt. I, ch. VI.
- (10) Selby-Bigge: *British Moralists*, sec. 846.
- (11) *Ibid.*, secs. 489, 498, 507, 521.
- (12) *De Legibus Naturae*, 1672. Cumberland stressed the social nature of man.
- (13) *Virtue or Merit*, Bk. I, sec. 1; cf. Hutcheson: *Moral Good and Evil*; see Selby-Bigge, secs. 2-5, 112, 117.
- (14) Preface and Sermons II and III; see S-B, secs. 190, 211, 221n.
- (15) Sermon II; see S-B, secs. 194, 217.
- (16) *Fable of the Bees*, 1714, 1723; see S-B, secs. 1,009, 1,012.
- (17) See his Account of Compassion: *Human Nature*, ch. IX.
- (18) H. Rashdall: *Theory of Good and Evil*, Vol. I, ch. II.
- (19) Sermon II and Preface.
- (20) Sermon III.
- (21) *System of Moral Philosophy*, 1755; see S-B, sec. 472.
- (22) The influence of Cudworth and Clarke.
- (23) Sermon II and Preface.
- (24) Sermon III.
- (25) *Analogy*, I, 6; see Sermon VI: ". . . our nature, i.e., the voice of God within us".
- (26) For Butler's complete ethical system, see *Sermons*, I-III; *Dissertation*, II; and *Analogy*, II.
- (27) Sermon XIII.
- (28) Sermon III, summary.
- (29) Sermon XI.

(30) S-B, sec. 1.

(31) Sermon XI.

(32) Sermon III, summary. In the Dissertation, self-love is not co-ordinate with conscience, nor is virtuous action wholly that aiming at the good of society.

(33) Price also anticipated Kant.

(34) *Theory of Good and Evil*, I, v, iii.

(35) See W. E. Gladstone: *Butler's Works and Studies Subsidiary to the Works of Butler*; also in *Mind*:—Menck: Butler's Ethical System, III, No. 11; H. Rashdall: Discussion on Bishop Butler, XI, No. 44. In the Dissertation, Butler has shaken himself entirely free from utilitarianism when he denies that utility is the quality in actions that makes them virtuous.

THE RIGHTS OF THE INDIVIDUAL

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ARGUMENTS about the rights of the individual are continually before us, not only in the pages of political philosophy, but also in the propaganda of modern political parties. There is the claim to the individual's right of property, or the right to freedom of contract; and there are claims to the right to work, or the right to strike. The purpose of this paper is to attempt to discover the ultimate ground on which the rights of the individual are based.

At the outset we must distinguish between legal and moral rights. A legal right is a condition of action recognized and enforced by the state. I am not here primarily concerned with the legal recognition, but with the moral sanction, not merely with those rights which are recognized, but with those which ought to be recognized. This distinction should make it clear that the very notion of rights implies an appeal to moral principles. We cannot separate rights from right.

It was in sixteenth-century England that the question of the rights of the subject first became prominent in political thought. Until then, the mediæval church held such sway over men's minds, and exercised such full disciplinary powers over their conduct, that the problem of individual rights could not arise. When the Reformation reduced the power of the church and emphasized the right of individual judgment in religious matters, a new spirit of individualism asserted itself. A new value was given to the individual citizen, and the question of his rights became central in political thought. Since then, there have been three main groups of theories directed to explain and justify individual rights: (i) The Theory of Natural Rights; (ii) the Utilitarian Theory of Rights; (iii) the Idealistic Theory.

I shall attempt to formulate a valid theory by examining these three in turn.

Hobbes and Locke are the leading representatives of natural rights. For both these writers natural rights are the powers men enjoy in the state of nature which precedes the establishment of political organization. Yet they hold very different views of the conditions prevailing in this natural state, and their accounts of natural rights are consequently opposed.

Hobbes' description of the state of nature is based upon his psychology of the individual. Man is moved to action, not by reason or ideals, but by passions, and although passions take different forms, they are all methods of self-seeking. Man

is innately and incurably selfish. The longing for security and the lust for power dominate his life. It follows that in the state of nature every man is at war with every man, and force and fraud are the cardinal virtues. Under such conditions each individual has a right to everything which will secure his own preservation. An individual's rights will be limited not by any moral law, but simply by his own power. These conditions are so intolerable that sheer self-interest, a fusion of fear and greed, drives men to make a social contract. The best arrangement is one which allows the individual to do just as he likes to others, and to be secure from any reprisal; but this is, unfortunately, impossible. Hence, by the terms of the social contract, men give up the rights which they possessed in the state of nature to a sovereign whom they appoint for their protection. The sovereign himself is not a party to the contract, for that would tie his hands; and if social unity is to be achieved it is essential for his power to be absolute, for "covenants without the sword are but words and of no strength to secure a man at all."¹ In the resulting civil state individual rights are dependent upon the sovereign will. They are the product of civil law. Although the freedom which men thus enjoy is a mere fraction of the freedom which in theory they enjoyed in the state of nature, in practice it is greater, and it is secured by the sovereign's power. Yet there is one right which they have not surrendered: the right of self-preservation, for self-protection was the only reason for the contract. Hence, the individual has the right to resist the sovereign if his own life would be endangered by obedience.

Such, in brief, is Hobbes' theory. What does it teach about individual rights? First, that if by state of nature we mean, with Hobbes, an anti-social state, then individuals living in such condition can have no rights, in the moral sense. Their rights are their powers. Social relations of some kind are the essential conditions of rights. Second, Hobbes' teaching shows that any theory which attempts to construct a society out of individuals who are purely selfish is self-destructive. It is because men are unscrupulously selfish that the sovereign must be given absolute power, and it is also because they must above all else seek to preserve their own lives, that they have the right to set limits to the sovereign's power if their own lives are endangered. Where there are no values recognized as greater than the preservation of life, there can be no social solidarity and no loyalty. Hobbes is in the peculiar position of believing that man is a complete individualist, in the most narrow meaning of the word, and for that very reason, he is, in his political theory, the most unrelenting enemy of

¹ "Leviathan", Part II, chap. 17.

individualism. So that whereas in the state of nature Hobbes makes the rights of the individual the product of the individual's power, in the civil state they are the product of the sovereign's power. On either basis, a right has no moral sanction.

Locke presents us with a very different picture of the state of nature. It is a state of perfect freedom and equality, of peace and goodwill. Unlike Hobbes' inferno, it is essentially a social state, involving rights which men respect and obligations which they fulfil. This marks a real advance on Hobbes' theory, for Locke recognizes that man, no matter how primitive, is social by nature. To say that the most primitive man lived in a society is not, of course, to say that he lived in a state. Locke's point is that wherever there are social relations there are rights, although it is not until these relations are politically organized by the establishment of the state that the rights are given legal status. Yet there are inconveniences in the state of nature which prompt men to establish a civil society. On entering this political state, individuals do not, as in Hobbes, surrender the rights they enjoyed in the state of nature, for the whole purpose of political organization is to secure individuals more effectively in the enjoyment of the more fundamental rights. They give up the less important and derivative rights of the state of nature, in order that the three basic natural rights of life, liberty, and property, may be uninterruptedly maintained. Although men naturally live sociably together, whether in the state of nature or the political state, the function of government is not directly to promote the social good, but to preserve the natural rights of the individual. Life, liberty, and property, these three, and, according to Locke, the most important of these is property; for it is the essential condition of the others. Hence, the first business of the state is to maintain the right of the individual to private property.

Locke analyses the basis of this right with some care. Originally the earth and all its fruits were given to mankind in common. But neither the earth nor its products is of use to man until appropriated. The act of appropriation may involve much labour or little, the slow tilling of a field or the careless plucking of a wild berry. But it does demand some labour, and it is the labour which gives the products their value. If a man mixes his labour with the things of nature, he thereby establishes a natural right to their ownership. Further, the employer of labour has the right to the product of the labour of his servants or his animals. "Thus, the grass my horse has bit, the turfs my servant has cut . . . become my property without the assignation or consent of any body"¹

¹ "Civil Government", Book II, chap. 5.

for "the labour that was mine" has made them mine. There is also a natural right to the inheritance of property. Before the use of money as a means of exchange, property was mostly in perishable goods, and there was a danger that some might acquire more than they could use, and thus rob others of its use. At this stage of economic evolution, therefore, men's possessions must be limited by their capacity to use them. But when the invention of money made it possible to convert the surplus of perishable goods into coin, this danger of depleting the common stock was removed, and then there were no limits to the natural rights of ownership. This treatment of money forces us to discount Locke's verbal provisos that a man's right to property is limited by the needs of others. But these provisos do indicate, perhaps, that there was a conflict in Locke's mind between his desire to justify the absolute nature of property rights and his sense of the claims of social welfare.

What, then, is the validity of the claim that the individual has a natural and absolute right to the fruits of his labour? I suggest, firstly, that it cannot provide a justification for the rights of property as Locke understood them, or as they have been legally recognized at any time. If it is the fact of my labour that gives me the right to the wealth which my labour produces, it is the logical corollary that I have not the right to the wealth which someone else produces. This surely rules out my right to the product of the labour of my servant or grandfather. Secondly, it is impossible to apply this theory in practice. I talk airily about the ground I have cleared, the house I have built, or the book I have written, and am inclined to forget that at every turn I am dependent for my food, my implements, and my training upon the labour of others. When industry was carried on by simpler family methods, it might have been a little less difficult than today to determine precisely how much the labour of each individual produced, but in the complexity of modern industrial organization, any attempt to apportion to each individual the fruits of his labour is ludicrous. "What proportion of the goods carried by a railway", Bertrand Russell asks, "should belong to the goods porters concerned in their journey? When a surgeon saves a man's life, what proportion of the commodities which the man subsequently produces can the surgeon justly claim?"¹

But it may be claimed that Locke has other arguments for the justification of property. There is ground for the contention that he does not justify property only because it is the product of labour, but also because it is the necessary condition for the enjoyment of the right to life. On this view it would derive its moral sanction, not from the manner of its acquisition, but from the end which it serves.

¹ "Principles of Social Reconstruction", p. 124.

There are two objections to this argument. First, property can only be justified as a means if the end which it serves has moral value. It is questionable whether the claim to self-preservation is a moral claim, whether life in the sense of continued existence has moral value. We are too liable to prate about the right to life without designating what kind of life. And are we not too liable in political theory to assume the desirability of "keeping the body going at all costs", to use a phrase of Lord's? Whenever a nation declares war it assumes that its citizens have no right to life as such, or at least that they will not desire to enjoy this right, if life is robbed of that which makes it worth living. Second, even if we were to agree that the individual does possess the right to life, as the obvious condition of living a good life, is the ownership of property essential to that right? We need to consider carefully what is involved in the idea of private ownership. Speaking generally, it includes the rights to the use, enjoyment, and control of things. The third of these, control, involves the right to destroy or to give away the commodity. The idea of control is essential, for a man may be provided with food, shelter and clothing by an institution. These he may use and enjoy, and thus maintain his life, perhaps a very comfortable life, but he is not free to cut up the furniture for firewood, or give away his clothes to the poor.¹ The use of commodities is essential to life, but not the right to their exclusive control.

But, it may be urged, even though the control of property is not necessary to the maintenance of life, it is a condition of the good life, and this is a legitimate development of Locke's doctrine. This claim may be granted, but only on the understanding that the good life for the individual is one aspect of the social good, that his welfare is dependent upon social welfare. That is to say, that we cannot understand the nature of the individual, still less the nature of his highest good, if we regard him as isolated, independent, or exclusive. His good can only be achieved through his social relationships, through his contribution to the common good. This does not mean that social relationships must be added to individuals, as couplings are added to railway carriages (to use a simile of McIver's), or that the common good is something qualitatively different from the good of individuals. Nor does it mean that the common good is merely the aggregate of individual goods. The relation between the good of the individual and the good of society is neither arithmetical nor transcendental; it is a relation of reciprocity and harmony. And if we emphasize the social rather than the individual aspect of the good as the criterion of individual rights, it is because the individual's

¹ Cf. Hobhouse's treatment of property in "Elements of Social Justice".

claim to a right is a claim made upon society by virtue of his membership. The individual right to property then, in the sense which includes control, is morally valid if it can be shown to be a necessary condition of the individual's contribution to the common good.

In the light of this criterion, it should be possible to summarize the weaknesses and the value of the theory of natural rights. The word "natural" shields a dangerous ambiguity. To Hobbes and Locke it means original or primitive, and they seek to justify the rights which were recognized in their time by showing that they were deducible from rights enjoyed in the past, or rights which would be enjoyed if the complexities of established political institutions were removed. Such a view regards the institutions established by civilized men, and especially the state, as a conventional superstructure built upon an order of natural rights. Such a theory evades the real issue involved in the question of rights. For to explain that rights recognized today are deducible from those recognized in the past, does not prove that such rights should have been recognized, either then or now. And this view falsifies the nature of the state in so far as it regards it as an artificial structure. As the state has been established to meet the needs of social beings, it is a means for the development of their nature. And the nature of the state, like that of man himself, consists not in what it once was, but in what it is tending to become.

To regard rights as natural in the sense in which these writers use the word, leads to a static view, to the belief that what was natural once must be natural now. It is true that the formal principles of the moral life are unchanging, but the concrete objects to which the principles apply change as life changes. The abstract right to property is one thing; the right to a particular kind of property here and now is another. The prevailing form of private property before the industrial revolution and the rise of joint-stock companies was very different from the prevailing type today, and its ownership served a very different purpose. From the viewpoint of social purpose the peasant's property in the land he cultivates is very different from the landowners' property in mining royalties. Hence, as Muirhead points out, "it is vain [for Locke] to try to define these rights as life, liberty, and property . . . [until we know] what is the kind of life, what use is to be made of the liberty, wherein the right to property precisely persists".¹

There is at least one element of value in Locke's insistence that rights are natural. He sees clearly that rights are not created by the state. Hobhouse distinguishes three stages

¹ "Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics": Article on "Rights"

of social development: (1) the existence of bare social relationships, *i.e.*, some form of human intercourse; (2) the existence of durable societies with a regular structure; (3) the development of politically organized societies, *i.e.*, states with a legislature to crystallize, a judiciary to interpret, and police to enforce the recognized rights.¹ Locke is right in insisting that rights and obligations exist in the first of these stages. In McIver's phraseology, community is prior to the state, and men possess rights as members of a community, and not only as members of a state.

THE UTILITARIAN THEORY OF RIGHTS.

The theory of individual rights propounded by Bentham marks an advance on the natural rights theory in so far as the Utilitarian measures rights on the basis of their usefulness, *i.e.*, in the light of the end which they serve. For Bentham, all discussion of natural rights is "simply nonsense, natural and unprescribable rights rhetorical nonsense—nonsense upon stilts".² Rights are the product of law, and the moral sanction of the law rests upon its usefulness in promoting the greatest happiness of the greatest number. By happiness Bentham means a sum of pleasures, for all pleasures are of the same quality, and by society he does not mean an organic unity but an aggregate of individuals. The political rights which the state should secure to the individual cannot be determined in the abstract, but only by an examination of their practical consequences for the greatest happiness. This desirable end can only in fact be achieved if the widest possible rights are granted to individuals. For since man is by nature selfish, he will only produce wealth if he is sure of reward. We need not deplore this, for there is a pre-established harmony by which each individual, in seeking his private gain, will at the same time contribute to the good of society, for it is good for society that wealth should be produced. *Laissez-faire* is the guide for political theory.

There is an appearance of straightforwardness, common sense, and ease about such a theory, but appearances are deceptive. The Benthamite theory was applied to industry in England at the time of the industrial revolution. It was by this theory that the government justified itself in not interfering with the owners of mines and factories, for were not the owners succeeding in achieving their individual profit, and must not this, by the principle of pre-established harmony, produce social welfare. It is unnecessary to elaborate on the

¹ "Elements of Social Justice", p. 35.

² "Anarchial Fallacies".

long train of miseries which the policy of *laissez-faire* produced for the workers of England. The theory of unrestricted individual rights means in practice no limit to the rights of the strong, and every limit to the rights of the weak. It is an abandonment of the moral standpoint. As in Hobbes' state of nature, men's rights are once again limited only by their powers. The theory has been refuted by history, and that is the only refutation which a Utilitarian would admit. The series of nineteenth-century factory acts were the legal recognition that *laissez-faire* was bankrupt.

Notice the difference between the individualism of Bentham and that of Locke. Locke attempts the moral justification of private property rights by the labour theory of value. Bentham holds that property rights are the necessary incentive to the production of commodities, and it is useful to the community that commodities should be produced. There are two weaknesses in this theory: (1) It must be shown that the commodities produced are useful to the community. What if it is the production of harmful drugs or harmless patent medicines? (2) The absolute right to private property, particularly in the aspect of hereditary rights, may destroy more incentives than it creates, as in the case of those who live in idleness by inherited wealth.

The chief interest for my purpose in John Stuart Mill's modifications of Utilitarianism lies in his elaboration of the individual's right to liberty. According to Mill, we may distinguish between individual and social actions. "What then", he asks, "is the rightful limit to the sovereignty of the individual over himself? Where does the authority of society begin? How much of human life should be assigned to individuality, and how much to society?"¹ He replies that the rights of the individual cover "the part of a person's life which concerns only himself". But society has the right to interfere in that part which concerns others. Thus a man may be justly punished for not paying his debts, but not for the extravagance which has prevented his payment. "No person ought to be punished simply for being drunk; but a soldier or policeman should be punished for being drunk on duty. Whenever, in short, there is definite damage, either to an individual or to the public, the case is taken out of the province of liberty, and placed in that of morality or law."²

The first inevitable criticism of this theory is to state once again the truism that no division can be made between individual and social acts. The most private and secretive act of the individual will, in affecting himself, affect his capacity to render service to society. Yet to disagree with the form

¹ "On Liberty", chap. IV.

² *Ibid.*, chap. IV.

of Mill's argument is not to disagree with the substance of his conclusion, that there is a sphere where society should not interfere. A man's religious faith, his thought, his personal affections should be free from restrictions. But the reason why the state should not try to enforce obligations in this realm is simply that it is not capable of doing so. It is not that this realm is sacrosanct because private, but because, in McIver's phrase, of "the pitiful irrelevance of force". Morality is an inward thing dependent upon motives, and force, the only instrument at the state's disposal, cannot create good motives. It can only create the fear of punishment or the desire for reward. Society then can only enjoin or forbid external acts; it has no power to control the motives of the actions. Now there are some acts which possess value almost solely from the motives from which they are performed, such as attending church services, while there are others, keeping drains clean, for example, which, merely as acts, have important consequences. We are thus led to adopt Green's principle, that the state is only justified in compelling the performance of those acts which it is better to have done from the wrong motives than not to have done at all. When we shop, we hope that the salesman will give us the correct change from the right motive, but we should prefer him to give us correct change from the wrong motive than that he should give us the wrong change. We hope that the householder will keep his yard clean from a sense of civic duty, but it is better for him to do so from fear of the inspector than that the health of his district should be jeopardized. The state cannot enforce motives; but it can enforce obligations, and any right enjoyed by one individual involves a corresponding obligation on others.

Our conclusion so far, then, is that the individual has the right to liberty in thought and in motive, simply because the state cannot control these, but that the state should enforce any external acts necessary for the promotion of the public good. This means that the individual is free to do right, but not to do wrong. It may be objected to this conclusion that if a man is only free to act in one direction, he is not free at all. Such a conception, writes Professor Hobhouse, "precisely omits the vital point of liberty. It is good that man should exercise his own will. The good loses one-half of its goodness if not done from choice, and if there is choice there must be the chance that the good will be rejected."¹ Mill states this point a little differently. "In many cases, though individuals may not do the particular thing so well, on the average, as the officers of government, it is nevertheless desirable that it should be done by them rather than by the government, as a means to their mental education."²

¹ "Elements of Social Justice", p. 7.

² "On Liberty", chap. V.

This view might be stated in another way. The individual is born with a certain definite area of freedom. It is necessary to make some inroads upon this area, because the exercise of some freedom will cause obvious and immediate physical damage to others, but it is important that no greater area than is absolutely necessary should be alienated. For every piece of freedom lost means the narrowing of the field of individual choice. Such a view falsifies the whole relationship of liberty and law, rights and obligations. When an obligation is enforced upon the individual in the interests of the common good, it does not restrict but increases the individual's range of choice. The fundamental error of the individualist view of rights is that it begins by assuming that the individual is born with a certain definite area of freedom. If that is true, it follows that the compulsory observance of the rights of others will reduce it. But if we give up looking at freedom in terms of area, and view it in terms of life, we will recognize that with living things some restrictions are the positive conditions of their growth. A trellis restricts the freedom of a creeper to sprawl over the ground in every direction, but it is only by adapting itself to these restrictions that the creeper can be free to spread itself at greater heights. From one point of view we restrict the creeper's rights to spread along the ground, to safeguard the rights of other plants which it would strangle, but from another point of view the restrictions are also the conditions of its own welfare, of its own distinctive growth.

Or, take an example from human society. There has recently been much discussion of the principle of family endowment. One of the criticisms of providing for mother and children in the same direct way that provision is made for the father, is that such a practice will narrow the range of a father's family affections. It will sap his independence and prevent him from exercising the morally valuable qualities that are demanded in providing for his family needs. If it is not left to the wage-earner's own choice whether he gives his wife and children a fair proportion of his earnings, we are narrowing the range of his personal freedom and his opportunity of moral development. This, according to Green, and not the principle of *laissez-faire*, is the real objection to paternal government. It is easy to show that the needs of the family must be considered as well as the needs of the man, but that is not the present point. What I suggest is that direct provision for the family may be just as important for the moral development of the man as it is for the welfare of the family. For what chance is there of the man being able to promote his family interests in an atmosphere of trust and affection if the family is in physical need? If a man is in the habit of spending his wages at an hotel instead of taking them home, this will

result in poor meals, ill-nourished children, and a discontented wife—precisely the atmosphere which makes the development of family affection impossible. The view we are examining seems to suppose that the choice of supreme importance for the development of the married man's character is that between the grocer and the publican. If the husband is relieved of the moral obligation to provide the necessities of life for his family, that does not mean he has no further duties to them. Rather will it be that a happy healthy family will give him the opportunities of developing his own nature as a father in many ways impossible before. It is not simply a conflict between the rights of the father and of the family, but between his own right to be wasteful and intemperate and his own right to be a father in the fullest sense.

The conflict of rights is no longer only between the claims of different individuals, but between different rights within the same individual. Consequently, an obligation has a double reference. It is a means which secures the interest of others and at the same time the individual's own deepest interest. In other words, the interests of the individual and of others are identical.

THE IDEALISTIC THEORY OF RIGHTS.

Such a conclusion represents the Idealistic attitude towards rights. In criticizing both the theory of natural rights and the utilitarian theory, I have been adopting the principles of what I have called the Idealist position. This is the view that the only moral criterion of an individual right is the degree in which its exercise will contribute to the social good. No right belongs to the individual as such, but only in virtue of the social function, which its possession will enable him to fulfil.

I have not yet considered one feature of the idealist doctrine as it is expressed by Green and Bosanquet. This is the contention that the moral sanction of a right depends not only on its relation to the common good, but on the social recognition of that relation. That is to say, that a power does not become a right until it is recognized as such. At first glance this contention seems to destroy the objectivity of rights, to annihilate morality. This question needs close examination. We must distinguish between the recognition of a right by law and a right which, though illegal, is recognized by public opinion. Green admits that actual states do not always fulfil their ideal function of upholding every interest based upon the public good, so that in some circumstances the assertion of a right unrecognized by the state may be justified, but only on the condition that society recognizes the inadequacy of the law. "The assertion, however", writes Green, "by the

citizen of any right which the state does not recognize must be founded on a reference to an acknowledged social good." "The reason that the assertion of an illegal right must be founded on reference to acknowledged social good is that . . . no exercise of a power, however abstractedly desirable for the promotion of human good it might be, can be claimed as a right unless there is some common consciousness of utility shared by the person making the claim and those on whom it is made."¹

This is a feature of the idealist position which cannot be accepted. Yet we should notice the very important element of truth which it contains. Its real value lies in the insistence that political organization and social co-operation are themselves elements in the common good. Even though the actual state as it exists today, and the public opinion of today, may fall far short of recognizing the full moral rights of the individual, yet they do recognize a number of rights, and they do conserve many genuine social interests. It is easy to point to the shortcomings of our political organization, but we must remember that without organization we should not be able to realize any social good. Again, to say, with Green and Bosanquet,² that a power is not a right until it is socially recognized as such, is not to imply that right is merely the product of social recognition, that public opinion is always right. It is not a question of abstract right, but of what is right for the individual in a concrete situation. The individual can only ultimately achieve the absolute right through the medium of imperfect social relationships and institutions. He cannot repudiate this medium; he must accept it, and mould it patiently to the best purposes, and he will often find it resistant to change. It is not, then, a question of what is the right action for an individual living in an ideal society: but the right action in the circumstances in an actual society. He may not believe that the opinion of the majority is right, but he may still feel that it is right to obey the majority, since to defy its will would be to disintegrate the conditions of social co-operation. When the majority resists the claim of an individual to the exercise of a power which he feels to be a right, the real ethical problem for him is not whether this right is necessary to the common good of an ideal society, but whether in fact the assertion of this claim, in defiance of the majority, is likely to promote the common good of the particular society in which he lives.

All this may be granted, yet does not Green go too far in saying that social recognition is always an essential condition to the existence of a concrete right. It is easy to say that men

¹ "Principles of Political Obligation", paragraph 143.
² "Philosophical Theory of the State", chap. VIII.

have the right to criticize laws, and not to break them, but what if law, supported by the majority, forbids any criticism? Under such conditions, is a minority convinced of the moral foundation of the rights denied to individuals, without the concrete right either to criticize or rebel? The position is further complicated by the difficulty of discovering what the opinion of the majority is. What if the attitude of a considerable proportion of the majority which appears to support the unjust laws is one merely of passive acquiescence, and not of active support? Green contends that a political system is always based upon the will of its members, even under conditions as in Tzarist Russia; for ignorant submission is a form of will. Surely this is to put a strain on the meaning of the word "will", for it obscures the difference between passive acquiescence, which may be due to ignorance or fear, and active intelligent support. In opposition to Green,¹ we are forced to admit that there are some circumstances in which there is moral justification for the exercise of rights, which are not only illegal, but also without social recognition.

The test is a utilitarian one. Is the element of the common good which will be promoted by achieving the right in question of such supreme importance that it outweighs the other elements of the common good which the state in question does maintain. If so, then the minority is morally justified in exercising the right.

There are, then, two principles by which the individual should be guided in determining whether he possesses a right to the power which he claims: (1) Its exercise must be a condition of the common good; (2) if its claim is not recognized by the majority, its value as an element of the common good must outweigh the harm done by the disruption of other elements in the common good, which its assertion by force will involve.

We may apply these principles to the claims asserted by the Communist. The Communist asserts that there are certain economic rights which the members of the working class are not, but should be, granted; that it is only a minority of the community which will actively recognize these claims; that such a minority is justified in attempting to secure these rights by the prosecution of a class war and the overthrow of the existing state by force.

¹ It is possible that the criticism of Green's insistence that "social recognition" is an essential condition of a right may be a criticism of his use of words rather than a disagreement with the substance of his teaching. Green is ambiguous on this point. In paragraphs 107-109 ("Political Obligation"), he admits that a minority may have a *duty* to resist a despotic government, but this duty only becomes a right when it is socially recognized. From the ethical viewpoint, how can resistance be a duty and not a right? The standpoint of this paper is that duties and rights are two aspects of the same thing. The reason why it is difficult to interpret Green is that he does not regard a "right" as a purely ethical concept, but as a mixture of ethical and juristic elements.

What, then, according to our principles, are the questions which an individual must ask himself before he can determine whether the Communist claim to revolution represents an ethical right ?

First, he must discover what the Communist means by the rights of the working class. Is the working class an aggregate of individuals who possess identical selfish interests, or is it an organic group animated by a genuinely common interest ? The difference is important, for if working class loyalty is simply a bundle of individual grievances its triumph over the owning class would not involve any alteration in social structure. The individualist conception of rights would still be supreme, and the revolution would simply mean a change in the personnel of the ruling class. As De Lisle Burns remarks : " It is no revolution which transfers one man's million pounds, so that a million men have one pound, if they all want to use their one pound as the one man used his million. For the same usage will soon operate to transfer all these pounds again into the hands of one man."¹ Such a revolution would involve a temporary redistribution of wealth, but no transformation of social principle. On the other hand, it might be that the working man's loyalty to his class is loyalty to a social principle—the principle that private property is not an absolute individual right, but should be related to the social functions which the individual performs. If this is the basis of working class solidarity, the opposition of interests with the owning class will not be based primarily on the feeling of jealousy that the others have succeeded in obtaining the material goods which they themselves desire, but on the conviction that the owning class represents an anti-social principle. The essential point is that in so far as the working class consciousness is based upon loyalty to a social principle, such a principle must be applicable to any class which accepts it. For the first characteristic of a common interest is that it can always be extended to those who are willing to share it, and it is enriched by such extension. But an individual interest is essentially exclusive.

Second, the individual must be reasonably certain that the economic right which Communism tries to secure is of such importance for the common good that he is justified in promoting a class war, which will inevitably do violence to other elements in the common good. For even if, for the sake of argument, we grant that in the present state of affairs the economic interests of the workers and the owners are opposed, we must remember that there are other interests which unite these two classes : the common traditions of the soil, the

¹ "Philosophy of Labour", p. 120.

bonds of family, the national sports, and the many daily interests of social intercourse. The individual must be sure that these interests which unite are outweighed by the economic interests that divide. It will depend, in short, on the importance to be placed upon the economic interest in relation to other interests. And the importance of that interest will, in any given circumstances, depend upon the urgency of primary economic needs.

Apart from the bare principle that the rights of the individual never inhere in the individual as such, but are always relative to the common good, I am not sure that this paper gives much guidance as to what are the concrete rights of the individual, but I hope that it at least gives some indication of what they are not. The concrete rights of the individual cannot be determined in any given case without a full analysis of the prevailing social conditions. The determination of concrete rights in a given case is thus a matter for political science rather than for political philosophy.

AN EXAMINATION OF REALISM.

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THIS paper is the outcome of a conviction that the widespread contemporary belief in the bankruptcy of Idealism is ill-founded, and that the complementary belief as to the obvious truth of Realism is unable to withstand careful scrutiny. It may be that I have gone altogether astray in my thinking, but I am convinced that some of the principles on which Realism bases itself and some of the arguments by which it buttresses itself are so palpably unsound as to cause wonder why admittedly competent minds have accepted them. Is it true that philosophers, like their "plain" brethren, must have a change?

It is with the cardinal principle of Realism, common to its many forms, that this paper will mainly occupy itself. The principle is variously expressed. According to Professor Montague, it is that "Realism holds that . . . the existence of a thing is not correlated with or dependent upon the fact that anybody experiences it, perceives it, conceives it, or is in any way aware of it". This, of course, is meant to be the precise opposite of the Berkeleyan *esse est percipi*. Professor John Anderson¹ interprets the principle in an even more thoroughgoing way: "As Realists . . . we have to assert that nothing is constituted by knowing and nothing by being known." Subject and object, we are told, are perfectly distinct and independent.

"Nothing is constituted by knowing", says Anderson; elsewhere he remarks²: "to tell us what a man knows is not to give a description of that man", and "to tell us that a man knows is not to give a description of him". Now it is certainly true that to tell us what a man knows is not to give a complete description of him. A man does more with his mind than to know, and (assuming that mind stands for mind-body) any description of him must be in terms of the fullness of his mental operations and not of a portion only of them. But (if we confine ourselves to cognition) to tell what a man knows is to say a great deal concerning him. We can broadly distinguish between persons on this very basis, *e.g.*, between Einstein and the milkman, or between Einstein and Winston Churchill. That Einstein knows (or believes he knows) certain things is precisely what makes him Einstein; and that I do not nor ever can

¹ *Proc. Arist. Soc.*, Vol. XXVII, p. 62.

² *Ibid.*, p. 63.

know these things in the same manner is what hinders me from becoming the same sort of person. This seems so obvious that I fear I must have interpreted Professor Anderson in too simple-minded a fashion. Otherwise, who can doubt that the cognitions of, say, a wine-taster, a professor, or a pharmacist do go in each case to constitute what the person is?

It may be replied that what Realists deny is that knowledge content establishes *that* a person is. If a man has the suitable knowledge, it may make him a wine-taster but not a man. So, in general, to possess knowledge is not identical with possession of human status. To be sure: but if knowledge content is in question, to possess human knowledge is (partly) identical with being a man. It is one means by which we distinguish man from animal, as well as man from man. It is a vain enterprise to attempt to describe a man apart from his body of knowledge, in its main features, and equally vain to then expect that such a creature can intelligibly perform the operation of knowing. This is to make knowledge external in a very radical fashion.

We are also informed that to tell us *that* a man knows is not to describe that man. "We may believe that only beings of a certain sort do know, but that depends on our having recognized their character independently of their knowing."¹ As a comparable example, Professor Anderson remarks that we may believe a being to be a man in order that he may be a husband, but may not believe him to be a husband in order to be a man. Similarly, we may believe that a being must be a man in order to know, but not that he must know in order to be a man. I submit, however, that the two cases are not parallel, in that a person can be a man without being a husband, whereas he cannot be a man without being able to know. That is, to be a husband is not, but to be a knower is, of the essence of man. Once again I may have mistaken Professor Anderson's meaning, as he seems to be so obviously wrong. How in the world can you describe a man, or how can he be constituted, unless count is made of his knowing? It has long been the fashion in elementary books of Logic to define man as a rational animal; but it would seem that a new fashion has been adopted by some, and that certain Realists, obsessed no doubt with their own theory, have decided that rationality is no longer a necessary constituent of human nature.

I can well imagine that the Realist is still unabashed, and that with some impatience he may retort that what he means is this: the mere fact that a being knows is not identical with the fact that that being exists, and that what is denied is that simple existence is constituted by knowing. A being must

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 64.

exist in order to know, but need not know in order to exist. Let it be so; and let it be noted that this is a polemic against the opposite principle to that of Berkeley, *viz.*, *esse est percipere*, although this is the Berkeleyan principle concerning minds or spirits. We are asked to admit that existence is not all one with knowing. To be sure: presumably a stone can exist as a non-cognizing thing, but can a man? Simple existence is a very bare notion; we are compelled to ask, existence *as what?* before we can make the admission asked for. I suppose that if a man ceased altogether to know, he would equally cease to be a man; *i.e.*, existence *as a man* (not existence simply) and therefore as a knower would cease in his case. Moreover, it would be hazardous to deny that the beginnings of cognition may be synchronous with the very beginnings of man's foetal existence.

On the whole, therefore, I remain unconvinced by the attempt to make the knower related externally to his knowing either as act or content (if indeed content is a distinct entity). To say that the knower is not constituted by his knowing seems to fly in the face of some of the most commonly accepted psychological principles, and to deny that there is growth of knowledge. Assuming that the Realist does not deny this growth, where for him does it take place? Its locus may be in the knower, the knowing, or the known. Seeing that neither the first nor the third of these is constituted by the second, the growth of knowledge must concern the knowing, but it seems very forced to say that this growth is a development of knowing which leaves knower unaffected. But the Realist may repudiate three items in the knowledge transaction; he may retain two items and make knowing the relation, compresence, or what not, of those two. Then he seems compelled to explain growth of knowledge in one of three possible ways. It may take place (*a*) in the known but not in the knower, or (*b*) in the knower but not in the known, or (*c*) in both knower and known. If either of the possibilities (*b*) or (*c*) is realized, growth of knowledge does wholly or partly affect the knower. If the Realist chooses (*a*), he is thrown back on the mirror theory of knowledge and the interpretation of the knower as wholly passive in his knowing and as without any capacity to select things for his knowing. In a word, growth of knowledge must involve some change in the knower.

The other element in the cardinal principle of Realism is that nothing is constituted by being known. *Prima facie*, this is more difficult to refute than the first element, largely because it is more in accord with common sense. The best way to deal with it—perhaps the only way—is to maintain and defend the contrary thesis, that the act of knowing does affect and alter its object, and this not simply as “object”

but as "thing". I have no desire to state that the act of a particular knower constitutes the thing, in the sense that it calls it from non-existence into existence. I assume that affecting and altering are modes of constituting, and if we can establish these milder modes, the way will be opened (should we desire to pursue it) to a demonstration that the literal constituting of things by some mind is a pre-condition of their knowledge by any mind.

In order to face the matter fairly, I propose to take a hard case, and to ask whether the knowing of the moon does affect or alter it. It may seem very hazardous to assert that it does. If knowing affects a thing at all, there are two possible ways in which it may do so; and even if these two reduce ultimately to one, we may assume their distinctness for convenience of analysis. They are (*a*) by contemplation, as in seeing or hearing, and (*b*) by bodily action upon the thing. We may say at once that many things are altered in the manner (*b*), both as a result of previous knowing and as a means to further knowing. Every scientific experiment means some alteration of the thing to be examined or of its conditions; it is in the service of fuller knowledge and is an outcome of some degree of previous knowledge. As a more simple instance, we cannot know that a piece of rubber is elastic unless we pull it, nor that lead will easily melt unless we heat it. To be sure, in neither of these cases do we constitute the thing, nor do we radically change it into something else. The very condition of knowledge by a particular mind is that its objects should exist before, and be substantially the same during, the knowing of them. But we do make some alteration in rubber and lead, and this, too, as a condition of knowledge of them. How could Professor Anderson or anyone else gain knowledge of the contents of this article without altering the unopened form of the Journal as it comes to him from the printer?

It would be commonly held, however, that many things cannot be affected in the manner (*b*), that nothing can be affected in the manner (*a*), and that the moon is such a thing as can be affected in neither way. But it may turn out that the moon can be affected by (*a*), and that to the degree in which it cannot be affected by (*b*) does our knowledge about it fail, *e.g.*, as to what is on its other side.

First, as to the affecting of the moon by contemplating it. It is a pertinent question where the moon, as known, ends and where the knower begins. Does each terminate at the confines of its bodily mass? If so, it is an enigma how one can be known and the other know. Should we not rather say that "moon" means the mass of matter (or whatever "matter" now connotes), together with the physical effluences from it. Then my seeing the moon does affect it. The physical

effluences impinge on and stimulate my eyes and connected neural apparatus, which then are instrumental in some manner to my seeing the moon. Apart from this, the moon would remain invisible, and if the light waves from the moon to my eyes had fallen instead upon some other place, they would have failed to do and be what they actually did. In general, the moon would remain invisible were there no visual mechanisms in the universe. But the fully constituted moon is a visible moon, so that the seeing of the moon does something even to constitute it. It may be objected that the moon was made first and eyes afterwards, and that the latter have accommodated themselves to receive light waves, whereas it is a mere circumstance to the moon that anyone should see it. But this cannot be taken seriously, since it is never a mere circumstance to a thing to be and do whatever lies within the compass of its nature.

We are brought up here against the problem of the secondary qualities, which many Realists ascribe to things themselves, and concerning which Professor Anderson says that they are no more lacking to a physical object than its seen shapes. In defending this Realist contention it is the visible quality of colour which is used more than any other quality by way of example. When other sense qualities are considered, it is not nearly so obvious that the thing "has" them in its own right. Thus, Alexander feels the necessity of enlarging his argument when he wishes to show that sound is "in" a thing in precisely the same way as colour appears to be in it; and it may be not unfair to say that here he has to modify the starkness of his Realist principle.¹ Has anyone ever really answered Galileo when he asserted that, given the tickling of my body by a feather or the burning of my hand by fire, the tickling and the burning are not in the feather or the fire? If we are influenced by appearances in putting colour into (or on) a thing, why should we not be given pause by the apparent permeation of the whole atmosphere by sound, odour, or heat? I am not suggesting that a thing has nothing to do with its colour or sound, but that it is not the only thing that has to do with these, and that if we pass beyond the (original) thing we should not be estopped from bringing in the still other thing to which colour or sound appears.

The testimony of after-images, illusions, hallucinations, etc., has been well worked over in this connection, and I do not expect to say anything new or anything convincing to a Realist. All that I can do is to state that I am somewhat nonplussed to imagine how a Realist can avoid the anti-Realist interpretation of this evidence. If sense qualities are entirely and solely

¹ "Space, Time, and Deity", Vol. II. p 57 and note

the properties or functions of physical objects, how could such qualities be cognized in the absence of the objects? Or, if I fix my gaze upon a grey wall after having looked at a green surface, the wall will appear to be red. Will the Realist say that it *is* red, and that its redness is a function of the wall in the same way as redness is of blood? If so, will he further say that the greenness of one surface has power to produce redness on another surface by direct influence and not by means of a mind-body? Or, if I see the wall as red, and another person sees it as grey, will he (the Realist) say that the one object may be coloured over the whole of its surface in two diverse ways simultaneously? Perhaps he will attempt to wriggle off this hook by remarking that a knower may make mistakes in his judgments, and that these must be corrected by means of other judgments.¹ But this admission brings him perilously near to the coherence beloved of Idealists, and to the giving of an important function to the knower. Again, when a man under hallucination sees pink rats, what and where are the physical things in which the pinkness really inheres?

Prima facie, knowing is a transaction between two beings, knower and thing known. If it is a transaction, we may ask where the action arises, and whither it goes "across". There are three possibilities: (a) The action arises in the thing and passes across to the knower, who is fully passive. This means a mirroring theory of knowledge, with the knower otiose and knowledge, finally, a meaningless affair; but I do not see how some forms of Realism can escape this issue. (b) The action arises in the knower and moves across to the thing, which can only mean that the thing is a bare existent without character, and that the knower, out of his own resources, clothes it with character; but why should this transaction be called knowing the thing, since it is rather a knowing of the knower? (c) Action arises on both sides, and moves across from each to the other. This is the only supposition upon which knowing becomes intelligible. It means, if you like, that the two beings are compresent with and to each other, but this implies that each is for the other, and that the proper nature of things includes their capacity to be affected by knowers. A known world must be originally knowable. "World", in its full sense, includes both knowers and things. It would be strange if this compresence (in knowing) should be the only sort in that world in which there is no affecting of each compresent entity by the other.

The plausibility of the statement that knowing constitutes neither knower nor known depends upon a misleading

¹ Cp. Anderson *op. cit.*, p. 76 et seq.

simplification of the knowledge transaction. In the cognition by a subject of a thing, the cognition is taken as an isolated situation, the subject and thing are each taken as momentary. But each has more than momentary and isolated existence. The subject of this situation is part of a wider subject, and its momentary knowing adds itself to and is affected by previous momentary knowings. The thing in this situation is similarly part of a wider order; when we remember this, and apart altogether from the question of secondary qualities, it becomes clear that knowing may affect, alter, and even constitute the known. That is to say, even if my knowing the moon does not directly affect it, it does enable me to affect other parts of the known world which includes the moon. It has an intimate bearing upon navigation, the building of bridges, harbours, and inter-seas canals, and sometimes upon the alterations that follow from the attacks of armies or burglars. It is true that this alterative and constitutive function of knowing has its limits; it can reach no farther than the effects of the knower's bodily acts. In so far as these acts fail of effect does knowing fall short of fullness. Our knowledge of the moon is defective so long as we cannot get on to its surface and, *e.g.*, carry out physical and chemical experiments.

My assumption throughout has been that the knower is embodied, that "mind" is an abbreviation of "mind-body"; and this assumption is strongly favoured by Realists. But this very assumption does damage to the principle of Realism. Alexander analyses the knowledge transaction into act of mind and non-mental object. He then discusses the character of the act of mind, particularly the relation between cognition and conation. In giving primacy to the latter, he says that "the mental act is a conation, which is something mental and not physiological, and then cognition is simply the reference of this act to what is non-mental". Again, "primarily, conation is practical, and it issues in movements which tend to alter or destroy the object, or at least to affect our relation to that object. Thus, the perceptual conation of perceiving an apple is primarily one which issues in movements of seizing and eating the apple."¹ This view of the knower, as primarily conative in his knowing, is in flat contradiction with the principle of Realism, especially with that part of it which denies any alterative effect of knowing upon the known.

May I make a concluding remark about "constituting" in relation to mind as mind-body. I may seem to have taken "constituting" in a weakened form, and so to have evaded the main point of the Realist principle. In this weakened form, however, I have tried to show that knowing does or may

¹ *Op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 120.

“constitute” its object, while abjuring the belief that it need call that object into existence. And yet, conformably with the reminder that knower and known are each part of a wider order, and that both fall within the one world, it is lawful to say that the known is literally constituted by the knowing of it. The Idealist has frequently worked to this conclusion by an elaboration of the Berkeleyan principle that nothing can be like an idea but an idea, or, more fully, that knowing depends upon a basic similarity between knower and known. Against this principle the Realist is in violent revolt. For him, there is no necessity for the two to be similar—which he interprets to mean that a mind can know only itself, or that which it directly constitutes. There is, undoubtedly, one sense in which his interpretation is legitimate, but it may be suggested that on one of his own principles he need not repudiate this meaning. He takes the knower to be in some way a mind-body, and regards the known also as body or physical: this gives him a basic similarity between the two, and the way is so far cleared for the acceptance of the Idealist dictum that the body which mind-body knows cannot be mere body but is body that has been constituted by Mind. This further acceptance, however, depends upon a decided modification, perhaps a total abandonment of the cardinal principle of Realism in its thoroughgoing form.

ODOUR.

By FRANCIS LIONS, B.Sc., Ph.D.,
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THAT the sense of smell is developed to an almost uncanny degree in many animals is a matter of familiar experience. In man, however, it is now almost entirely hedonistic—a pleasure sense, the loss of which scarcely impairs the efficiency of the organism. To be sure, it has a slight warning value which makes one intolerant of defective sanitation or decomposing food ; though even this is overrated, as carrion is not necessarily poisonous and many people show decided preferences for certain kinds of highly odoriferous food—cheese, game, etc. On the other hand, the pleasure value is underrated because it is not generally realized that the “flavour” of food is an olfactory sensation.

The apparatus of taste can only distinguish four qualities—sweet, sour, bitter, and salty ; and all those manifold “tastes” enjoyed in foods are due to the perception of the characteristic odoriferous substances they contain. There are many simple proofs of this. Thus, when the sense of smell has been put out of action by a severe cold it is difficult to distinguish between an apple and an onion with the eyes closed, though it is easy to tell whether one’s tea is sweetened. The sense of smell may also be shut off by holding the nose firmly, and this can effectively prevent one from “tasting” an onion.

More smelling is done by way of the palate than through the nose, and it is probably our epicureanism which has kept up the acuteness of our sense of smell and perhaps saved it from degeneration. It is remarkably sensitive. Allison and Katz,⁽¹⁾ using the special type of odimeter they had evolved for testing stench, showed that artificial musk, the most odorous substance known, could be detected at a concentration of 0·00004 milligramme per litre of air ; i.e., assuming that 50 cubic centimetres of air are used in making the test, 0·000002 milligramme could be detected by odour. Oil of peppermint was detectable at a concentration of 0·024 milligramme per litre and was strong at 0·332 milligramme per litre ; whilst ether was detectable at 5·8 milligrammes per litre and was strong when the concentration reached 18 milligrammes per litre.

Although there are discrepancies between various determinations of olfactory acuity made by various workers, it must be admitted that olfaction is accomplished through very small—often infinitesimally small—amounts of material,

which yet involve immensely large numbers of molecules. In 0.000002 milligramme of artificial musk there are approximately 4,000,000,000,000 molecules.

The discriminating power of the sense of smell is also extremely fine. A good wine-taster can distinguish between thirty or forty varieties of wine with his eyes closed. But the wine-taster's skill falls at once to the ordinary level when he is tested with wines to which he is unaccustomed; for this faculty of discrimination is only brought out by education and interest. So soon as an interest is taken in scents—in those of flowers, for example—differences are noticed that were formerly unperceived, and the impression is gained that one's sense of smell is becoming more acute, though one is only realizing its keenness and making use of it.

The apparatus of the sense of smell is very simple. It is lodged in two small areas of slightly pigmented mucous membrane in the upper part of the nose, and consists of spindle-shaped cells, from each of which a number of short slender rods of a waxy substance—the “olfactory hairs”—project into the layer of watery mucous that bathes the interior of the nose. The olfactory cells enjoy a direct communication with the central nervous system by way of a prolongation of the brain itself, which ends round them in a mesh-work of nerve fibrils.

The olfactory area lies a little above and to one side of the main stream of entering air, so that to obtain the maximum appreciation of a faint scent it is necessary to give a short sniff which brings the scented air eddying sharply over the perceptive area. The outgoing current of air is directed passively over it, so that if one breathes habitually through one's nose, as one should do, the scent of any substance that is being swallowed is carried automatically over the olfactory area and no extra effort is required to appreciate it.

Although the olfactory organs in man are unquestionably concerned with the odours of the food being masticated, they are much more concerned with the odours of the environment. From this standpoint the olfactory organs are properly classed as distance receptors, or receptors affected by stimuli which emanate from more remote points in the surroundings. In consequence, one's olfactory sensations are, in a way, projected into the exterior, and the distant body is sought, avoided, or recognized by its odour. The smell of a skunk is undoubtedly a protective odour in that it can be sensed by other animals which will thereupon avoid its source. The great delicacy of olfaction among the higher animals, by which they can scent the hunter, is well known. Plants frequently elaborate odorous protective secretions to avoid attack, *e.g.*, the conifers exude a balsam into their wounds, and the essential oil of the Australian pines wards off the attacks of ants.

Other odours have much to do with sexual activities, whereby one sex is led to find the other or is otherwise excited to activity. It is of interest in this connection to note that odour has recently been shown to play an important part in the mating of many species of butterflies.⁽²⁾ This most specialized function of scent is not to repel but to attract. It is of particular importance to plants, and reaches its highest development in the flower, although it appears already among the fungi, notably in the stink horn (*Phallus impudicus*), whose horrible foetor, noticeable ten or twelve yards away, attracts blow-flies in large numbers. These feed on the foul smelling slime with which the cap of the fungus is covered, and carry away with them and disseminate the spores that are embedded in it.

The flower, in the ordinary sense of a conspicuous flower, is a mechanism called into being by the nectar-feeding insects which fertilize it. The colour, form and scent of the flower are adapted to the one end of attracting or guiding the insects that visit it for the plant's purpose of securing cross-fertilization; and flowers do not occur except in association with these insects. The earth was flowerless until the bees and butterflies appeared, and, today, where there are few nectar- or pollen-eating insects there are few conspicuous flowers. Noticeable also is it that the production of odorous substances in the flower ceases almost at once when fertilization has occurred; and that those flowers which are visited by night-flying moths are odorous at night and not by day.

Undoubtedly, however, the prime service of olfaction is in the quest of food. From the fishes* to the mammals olfaction serves as means of discovery of hidden or remote food, and in this respect it is a highly significant sense for the directions of locomotion. In man, and in other microsmatic forms, much of the keenness of olfaction has disappeared, and yet the high development of this sense in our ancestry has left such a profound impression on the organization of our central nervous apparatus that we are often surprised by the power of our olfactory sensations.

There are several theories of olfaction, but it is now generally accepted that the molecules of the odorous substance must come into direct contact with the olfactory cells. There is little to support the theory that odour is due to some kind of vibration or emanation which is dispersed in all directions

* Baglioni⁽¹⁾ (1909) showed that blinded fishes were excited by the presence of food; and Parker⁽²⁾ (1910-11) in conclusive experiments on catfishes (*Ameiurus*) and killifishes (*Fundulus*) showed that these sensed food by their olfactory apparatus and not through their external gustatory apparatus. This work was further confirmed by Sheldon⁽³⁾ (1911) working on dogfishes (*Mustelus*), and by Copeland⁽⁴⁾ (1912) on the swellfish (*Spheroideus*). Their results are in entire harmony with the well-known fact that fishes, especially sharks, can be drawn from a long distance by ill-smelling bait or by oily carcasses ground up and thrown in the water. The extremely small amount of substance needed in these operations agrees well with what is known of olfaction among air-inhabiting vertebrates and reaches almost infinitesimal proportions, as is indicated by the work of Olmsted⁽⁵⁾ on *Ameiurus* (1918).

from the odorous material as centre, as are sound and light. It is well known that odours may be carried on the wind for many miles. Moreover, some substances, such as arsenic, are odourless under ordinary circumstances, but have a pronounced odour after having been heated sufficiently strongly to volatilize. The fact, discovered by Woodrow and Karpman⁽⁸⁾ in 1917, that the adaption time for olfaction—the time needed for an olfactory sensation to wane completely—is directly proportional to the vapour tension of the odorous material, shows that olfactory stimulation is due to the activity of gaseous particles.

Many attempts have been made to correlate odour with chemical constitution, but except in certain restricted fields—*e.g.*, the synthetic musks, the violet perfumes, and certain of the rose odours—these have all proved abortive, and must at present of necessity prove so because one is dealing with a physiological reaction and not a chemical property which might be expected to vary regularly. One may use the analogy of the lock and key—our attempts to devise odorous substances resembling the empirical fashioning of the key. Occasionally a key fits—and a little more is known of the nature of the lock. It is known, in general, that to be odorous, the molecules of a substance must possess residual chemical affinity; usually containing one or more unsaturated groupings of atoms, called *osmophores*. Saturation causes loss of odour—a particularly useful fact in the industrial hardening of oils, such as unpleasantly smelling fish oils, coconut oil, etc., to odorous edible fats.

A further condition necessary for a substance to be odorous is that it must be soluble to some extent in both water and fats, though the ability to dissolve in oily substances has been shown to be probably much more important than the solubility in water. The “olfactory hairs” are lipid in character—they are best demonstrated with osmic acid—and project into a watery mucous. In order, then, for the molecules of a substance to affect the sensory cells they must first dissolve in the watery layer, after which partition occurs into the lipid “olfactory hairs”.

What the molecules of the odorous substance do after they reach the olfactory cells is still a field for speculation. The odorous particles, as such, disappear, presumably into chemical or close physical combination with the material of the cells. Thus it can be easily demonstrated by breathing a scented air through the nose and then immediately out again that it has become scentless, though adsorption on all the membranes of the nose is probably also here involved. The phenomena of olfactory fatigue—analagous in some ways to those of colour

vision and taste—also favour the theory of definite combination. In high concentrations most odorous substances soon cause a cessation of olfactory stimulation. Although this condition of irresponsiveness may be due, in part, to central nervous states, such as lack of attention, and the like, it is also dependent in part on peripheral exhaustion. Aronsohn showed that when oil of orange and oil of lemon were smelled by nine persons the odours of these substances could be no longer perceived, after a period varying between 2.3 and 11 minutes, with an average of 3 minutes. A 0.2 per cent. solution of coumarin in water was sensed for from 1.75 to 2.3 minutes, after which it could no longer be detected. The recovery of excitability is apparently equally rapid, and may be accomplished in as short a time as from 1 to 3 minutes, though complete recovery probably requires a longer time.

Olfactory fatigue accounts for the faintness of the scent of a bunch of boronia or native roses when one's nose is buried therein. It probably also explains, in part, the unpopularity of musk as a perfume, since those who use it become so quickly fatigued that they use it to excess and become insensible to the effect produced.

It is to be noted that there is usually a well-marked power of accommodation for particular odours. Persons whose occupations lead them to work among disagreeably smelling substances soon become insensitive to these. Winslow and Greenberg's⁽⁹⁾ experiments on young guinea-pigs exposed to faecal odours showed that these lost weight for a week, but then rapidly regained it and were soon in as good condition as the controls.

Cessation of olfactory sensation caused by over-stimulation by a particular odorous substance does not necessarily mean simultaneous loss of power to perceive other odours. Nagel⁽¹⁰⁾ showed that if a solution containing both vanillin and coumarin, but in such proportions that the vanillin odour completely masked the coumarin odour under ordinary conditions, was smelled after pure vanillin had been smelled long enough for complete fatigue, the coumarin odour was quite pronounced.

There are some substances whose odour appears to change on dilution. Thus skatole and indole in extreme dilution smell sweetly, like narcissus or jonquil, but in concentrated form have very powerful and disgusting faecal odours. Ionone, also, has a violet odour in dilute solution, but is a pleasant cedar-wood when concentrated.


Henning's theory of olfaction, which has been supported recently by Ruzicka,⁽¹¹⁾ accounts for the previously-mentioned phenomena as follows: The odoriferous particles are first adsorbed on to the surface of the perceptive area. They then penetrate the olfactory mucous membrane and dissolve in

the lipid layer according to the distribution law. Here physiological stimulation occurs, owing to a chemical reaction between the odoriferous substance and an active substance in the mucous membrane—called an “osmoceptor”. The most reactive osmoceptors (primary osmoceptors) are first combined whereby a characteristic odour is produced. If these primary osmoceptors are present in sufficient concentration, or if they are sufficiently rapidly renewed by the organism, the odour remains constant. On the other hand, if the osmophoric groups—the groupings of atoms in the molecule to which the odour is ascribed—after using up all the primary osmoceptors react with other (secondary) osmoceptors, another odour may, but not necessarily will, be perceived. The primary odour will persist so long as the odorous molecules enter the nose slowly. If, however, the odorous substance is used in concentrated form, a rapid saturation of the primary osmoceptors occurs, and the first smell can be partially or completely masked—which explains the property of skatole, indole and ionone previously mentioned—or complete fatigue may ensue.

Many attempts have been made to classify odours, but the qualities of these are almost innumerable. They do not fall into well-defined divisions as do tastes. The odours of new substances are almost certain to be individual and novel and to agree with those already known only in a general way. Thus they have a certain historical value and get their names after the introduction of the substances with which they are associated. The smell of carbolic acid was not generally known until this material was brought into common use. Should it be abandoned commercially, its odour would cease to be a part of common human sensation.

Haller, Linnæus and Zwaardemaker have all put forward schemes of classification. The latter divides odours into nine classes: etherial, aromatic, balsamic, ambrosial, alliaceous, empyreumatic, caprilic, repulsive, nauseating. However, different individuals classify the same odour in different of these divisions, *e.g.*, the odour of pyridine is repulsive to most people but not to all. The scheme is thus too associative and subjective, and hence artificial.

Henning claims that odours can be classed into six predominant classes: spicy, flowery, fruity, resinous or balsamic, burnt, and foul. Although each of these six classes is represented by a number of odours, it is not absolutely separated from the others, but between any pair of them there are many that assume intermediate places. He devised a scheme where the six predominant elements are placed at



the corners of a triangular prism. All odours, fundamental or intermediate, find places on the surface of the prism. Relations indicated by lines within the prism and connecting any two points on its surface indicate only mixed odours. The simplicity of Henning's scheme is at once its most attractive and suspicious feature.

The personal associations that are bound up with scents are notoriously vivid, and for every one of us there are certain scents or smells that instantly recall, often with hallucinatory clearness, some past experience. The experience is always one charged with emotion, usually pleasantly toned. If the process of recall be examined, it is found that the emotion comes back first and is followed, as a rule almost instantly, by the memory picture. Occasionally it takes some time to recollect the experience with which the scent is associated; sometimes, especially if the experience were unpleasant, it is altogether elusive and only a vague feeling is left, which may not even be associated with the scent that evolved it and is altogether inexplicable.

In conclusion, it is of interest to inquire why we like sweet scents. The sweetest scents are those of the "heavy and aromatic" group of flowers, and, in general, a scent, whether animal, vegetable or chemical, is sweet in so far as it resembles these. Now the heavy and aromatic flower scents have been evolved to match the scents of the moths and butterflies that visit them, and the scent of the butterflies plays a part in their courtship and serves to stimulate the mating instinct. We therefore react to the same scents in the same way as the moths and the butterflies, and unless there is a very remarkable coincidence, we do so for the same reason.

This conclusion, that the sweet scents unconsciously stir the old mating instinct, has been reached on other grounds by almost all observers who have studied the subject, and it is one from which there is no escape when it is noticed that the use of perfume in our Western civilization is limited to one sex, as is the production of scent in the moths, butterflies, musk deer, and crocodiles.

However, a scent is not sweet simply because it stirs the mating instinct, for the facts are quite otherwise. An obviously sexual scent, such as that of privet, is definitely unpleasant. The legitimate conclusion seems to be that suggested by Hampton: "A sweet scent is one that can stir the instinct of courtship without evoking the idea of the natural end object

of the instinct." It seems more exact to use the word "courtship" rather than "mating", since the appeal of scent in civilized man is associated with the stirring of an emotion, and not with the satisfaction of it. Since no object for the wakened instinct is presented to consciousness, the emotion set free is diffused into a vaguely pleasurable state.

This is a characteristic quality of scent that the feeling it evolves is strong, even poignant, while the sensory impression is vague, elusive, and difficult to describe or recall. This becomes more understandable when it is remembered that the appreciation of all beauty arose, in the dark beginnings of man, out of the stirring of the mating instinct. The beauty of form, colour, and sound has developed into an intellectualized æstheticism, but the olfactory impressions have never been built up into an art. The pleasure that we derive from a scent is just a little nearer to the fountain-head of all beauty than the pleasure we have from music, or from the colour or form of a flower, so that we are apt to regard it with a faint uneasiness. Yet the olfactory impressions play little or no part in the sexual life of normal man; they are more subtly appreciated by civilized than by primitive people, and they may one day form the material for an art of which we can barely imagine the form. For the present they offer a field of experience that is new to most and a source of pleasure that is not to be despised.

The author acknowledges his indebtedness to:

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THE DESTROYING ANGEL.

By T. JASPER.

RELIGIOUS sentiment is alive and abroad amongst us still, very little diminished in vigour from former days. The truth of this is evident when we overlook for an instant the objects upon which religious sentiment has nominally expended itself, and consider the sentiment in itself.

The former are matters of constantly changing convention, the latter an ever-present reality. Jehovah, Christ, Buddha, or Mahomet might cease to function as vital figures in human lives, but the spirit that sustained their worshippers will go marching on. Blind obedience to the requirements of the divinity, or to those divinely authorized within the chosen circle, fanatical intolerance of all without the circle (the latter following inevitably from the former), and forgetfulness of self-interest: these are distinguishing features of the religious sentiment. Viewed in this light, it is clear that the Jacobins of the French Reign of Terror, the Communists of the Russian Reign of Terror, and the Catholics of the Inquisition were inspired by very similar sentiment. Excellent examples of religious sentiment may be found animating some of Australia's most ardent trade unionists. Superstitious belief in the sanctity of the circle, selfless obedience to the high priests of the movement, fanatical intolerance towards all outside the circle: these are distinguishing features of the true trade unionist in Australia. Heretics are not dragged shrieking to the conventional torture chamber, but they are shunned socially, and incessantly harassed in their endeavour to obtain a livelihood. Indicating, not that the sentiments of our industrial Inquisitors are less sturdy than those of their Catholic prototypes, but simply that the fashion in torture chambers has altered. This venomous vitality cannot continue without strife, and that is why continuous strikes are deemed essential by the high priests of the creed.

Art, literature and science cannot thrive without physical peace, but religious sentiment cannot thrive without physical strife. The advent of religious tolerance, in England or elsewhere, has ever spelt the doom of religious ardour.

When we realize the distinguishing qualities of religious sentiment, it is easy to find modern instances. The fanaticism that inspires many devotees of Mammon has a religious quality. This money madness is undoubtedly intensified by the warfare between Capital and Labour. The capitalist would never value his wealth so highly were it not for the envy and enmity of organized labour. Hearing himself incessantly described

as a blood-sucker and a leisured parasite, he is hypnotized into holding himself the most favoured of mortals. Hence, he cannot realize that he is actually rendering up religious worship to a stone image. To this fetish he sacrifices his sense of proportion, numbs his finer sensibilities, and goes to his grave a bitter disillusioned man. One does not refer, of course, to all wealthy people, but to those whose predominant purpose is the accumulation of wealth. Incidentally, the war between Capital and Labour itself threatens to develop into the greatest religious war of all time.

From the foregoing it would seem that the individual strongly inspired with religious sentiment is on much the same moral plane as the glutton and the sexual maniac. On the other hand, that he is on a very pedestal of power in the matter of influencing his fellows is evident. Contrary to popular belief, religion has had very little to do with promulgating positive morality. This has been more the province of the philosopher and the artist; the former constructing essential ideals, the latter investing the dry bones with life. Notwithstanding metaphysical meanderings to the contrary, the good and the beautiful are closely connected. The tendency is to embody one's feeling for beauty in admirable actions. Pleasure and pain are, after all, the only real criterions of conduct, the former indicating what to pursue, the latter what to avoid.

The issue, however, is far from simple, since there are spiritual as well as physical pleasures, and thought is compromised by external exigencies immediately action is demanded. Moreover, the pleasures of an instant sometimes conflict with the interests of a lifetime. The fault with the present generation is not that it pursues pleasure, but that the pleasures it pursues are of a limited and transient nature. Religion has consistently applauded sacrifice and denounced pleasure, until the tree of life has grown all awry. If religious sentiment has been more vicious than valuable in the moral sphere, it has played an important part in developing and sustaining nationalism. In this connection the classic example of the Arabs under Mahomedanism may be cited, and, in present times, Japanese patriotism is notably intensified by the identification of the Emperor with divinity. Spain reached the height of her power in a frenzy of religious fanaticism, and Irish nationalism was strong mainly by reason of religious sentiment. Buddha and Confucius were nationalizing factors of some importance, and Jehovah had his Chosen People. In Christianity the universal brotherhood idea was a disquieting notion to the nationalist, but this idea receives some scientific and social acceptance today. At least, a trade brotherhood is being imposed upon us whether we like it or not. Incidentally,

the international brotherhood idea was the most irreligious idea imaginable, if we are to gauge religion by its practice and emotional quality and not by its occasional precepts. A suspicious and savage nationalism is a more suitable expression of the religious temper.

It is held in scientific quarters today that biblical figures and stories are mostly myths, but we cannot wisely dismiss them with a contemptuous gesture. It is all of intense interest to the psychologist, who sees in such superstitions the subterranean workings of the human mind. Jehovah and Satan, Heaven and Hell, indicate most of all the tendency of the human mind towards absolutism. Relativity might be a scientific and philosophical law capable of all kinds of verification, the human mind yet denies it. We have sat down to dinner with Jehovah and Satan, we have strayed awhile in Heaven and Hell, we cannot doubt their existence. They are as real as the Pyramids of Egypt, and probably more lasting. We can have neither truth nor tolerance while a belief in absolutism exists. And since in the final issue we can only construct a satisfactory social state with the aid of the latter, and by the light of the former, it seems as if religious sentiment is destined to be the destroying angel of our civilization. In its wake comes hatred and suspicion, and sacrifice, and static standards of life. It shuts out investigation from the mind and sympathy from the heart. It is intense and insistent, seeking a fresh figure head round which to raise its banner when the emotional value of the old has departed. It cannot be eradicated by education, and it has this treacherous quality that it is never so insistent on its virtue than when it is most vile. Mellowed it *might* become a factor in the sustaining of a World Socialism against the forces of disruption; but the forces of disruption are impersonal things, and religious sentiment needs a personal enemy.

A civilization based on capitalism has obvious limitations, but it may be the best we can construct. Barring the path to any kind of human unity stands an angel with a flaming sword.

DISCUSSIONS.

THEORY AND PRACTICE IN MORALS.

By JOHN ANDERSON.

IN practice "business is business"; it is only in theory that business is "service". Such appears to be the divergence between theory and practice in morals that Professor T. A. Hunter¹ regrets to find existing at the present day. But before we decide to share his regret, we may first of all ask in what sense the former position is moral practice, and in what sense the latter is moral theory. We may also ask whether there is really that divergence which Professor Hunter deplures, whether, in fact, the promulgation of the doctrine that business is "service" is not simply a part of business practice, and quite good business at that.

This doctrine would appear to be moral theory only on the assumption that moral theory is concerned with "value-predicates" such as "the serviceable"; that it builds on the foundation of duty, interest, utility, advantage and all the other pseudo-ethical concepts with which Socrates and Thrasymachus make play. But it is only from a *criticism* of such concepts, and a rejection of them on account of their relativity, that anything worthy of being called a *theory* of morals can arise. So long as statements which imply that it is "good" to do or to get "good" are allowed to pass, so long as such fundamental ambiguities have not been removed, there is no theory because there is no inquiry. "Service" and like notions are not appearances that have to be saved, but hypotheses that have to be destroyed.

Whether or not, then, a person who believes in service tries to "put his belief into practice", his theory is a bad one, and sincerity in "applying" it will not make his position any better. The view that goodness consists in *rendering* something to someone is sufficiently exploded by Socrates in the *Euthyphro* and Book I of the *Republic*. We cannot evaluate the rendering without considering the value of what is rendered, and when we consider the latter, it is an entirely separate and subordinate question how it was brought about, whether by being rendered or in any other way. It is to the neglect of this distinction that the confusion between the values of the two things is due, as well as the implicit suggestion that the goodness of a thing brought about confers some sort of value on the bringing of it about—as in Moore's theory of "good-as-means". In fact,

¹ "Theory and Practice in Morals": article in the March issue of the Journal.

the prominence given in ethical theory (and this applies to the theory of Socrates as much as to those he criticizes) to the notion of means-and-end obscures the fact that goods, when they do come about, are not generally "rendered", or brought about as "ends", but arise in the course of the development and interaction of enterprises the participants in which are not thinking about good at all. Moreover, although some of the conditions required for a person's good activities may be provided by other persons, the activities are *his* and are therefore not, strictly speaking, *rendered* to him by anyone else.

These considerations show how little weight can be attached to the abstract conception of "service", just as the general distinction between rendering and rendered suffices to dispose of the notion of "virtue". The former term may be retained if we use it in the precise sense of providing conditions upon which a person may enter on good activities, but this depends upon the recognition of these activities as good, a recognition which is not implied in the ordinary loose notion of "doing someone a service". This commonly means giving him something that he wants, and that may be neither good nor a condition of good. Moreover, in so far as the service rendered by *business* is thought of in this way, it is forgotten that business operations prescribe what people are in a position to want (limit their "effective demand"), by controlling supplies and by persuading the consumers that they want something which they have no real use for. Indeed, is not "I want to do you a service" the stock approach of the "confidence" merchant?

More generally, the advocacy of service is bound up with the doctrine of altruism which, like egoism, is founded on the confused conception of a person's "private good", whether this is thought of as being advanced by his own or by others' actions. This rickety foundation has to support the whole theory of "social service", and is used to justify all sorts of patronage and interference with people's lives, under the guise of assistance. The assumption of superiority and direction is, of course, quite incompatible with the co-operative conditions under which goods actually develop; and the vague term "service" is used to obscure the actual objects aimed at, and to secure that their goodness will be taken for granted instead of being subjected to examination.

Any "code" of morals is bound to be equally vague and confused, based as it is on the conception of moral theory as made up of *precepts*, i.e., of commands to render certain services. Professor Hunter has indicated clearly enough the weaknesses of the first code he cites, in which the trumpet of service is sounded with peculiar blatancy. But he passes over the similar defects of the second, and this is because, as I have tried to show, he has not sufficiently clarified the notions of

moral theory and practice. The second code follows the first in recognizing "service"; it merely substitutes a subdued egoism for outspoken altruism, and thus has the same moral foundation. And its promulgation may be just as good business as that of the first. "Giving the show away is a method like any other method", as Lord Summerhays, the diplomat, remarks in Shaw's "Misalliance". One is reminded of the curious view that prevails in certain quarters, that the Sophists were unpopular at Athens because they trampled on Athenian morality; the fact being that they were *exponents* of popular morality, and that Thrasymachus (apart from the taint of being a foreigner) would be a much more popular figure than Socrates. At any rate, it was Socrates that Rotarian Athens put to death.

It requires very little attention, then, to see that the second code is also marked by "humbug generally", from the "incidentally society" of the first article to the "fair treatment" of the last. "A company", we are told in Rule 2, "strives to be efficient in order to increase its custom rather than to benefit its customers". This frankness would quite disarm us, if we did not take time to remember that increasing its custom is what is *meant* by "efficiency". Similarly, in regard to Rule 5, it is prestige that defines a high business standard, not the standard that leads to prestige. The "reality" that Professor Hunter finds in this code (in the sense of its being something that men really try to "live up to") is simply not there. Ethics is equally absent, unless the term "service" is to be taken as properly ethical, and I have tried to show that it is not.

To sum up, there is not and cannot be any divergence between theory and practice in morals. There are no "ethical principles" which "control" business or any other human activity, high or low. There are only the human activities, exhibiting various characters, being good, bad or indifferent. Good and bad activities are moral practice, and these activities are the subject-matter of moral theory. To be a moral theorist is to study such facts, not to lay down rules. It is, of course, possible to have a false theory, and it is only as meaning false theory that "principles denied in practice" could have any significance for ethics. Certainly, many people say that X is bad, and yet do X; there is no divergence between theory and practice here, unless doing anything implies saying that it is good—which is not the case; and even if it were, the divergence would be between theory and theory. Certainly, also, moral theory should take account of the facts involved in "not practising what we preach", *i.e.*, not doing what we advise others to do, or even profess to do ourselves. But advising is not expounding moral theory and neither is professing; the

good is not "the advisable" or anything else of a *relative* kind. The divergence, then, is between the false moral theory which sets up relative notions of obligation, service, and the like, and the true moral theory which knocks them down and describes good and bad activities as they are (not forgetting, of course, how they develop and are interrelated).

For the reasons outlined above, I dissent from Professor Hunter's conclusion (which had, no doubt, a somewhat ironical intention, but is sufficiently in accordance with the rest of the article to call for criticism) that business codes of "service" are a departure from the conflicts of actual existence to an ideal or imaginary world. Granted that, as moral pronouncements, they are false, the making of them falls along certain lines of practice which have perfectly definite moral characteristics. The theory of "service" attempts to deny that particular organizations pursue particular objects, and substitutes something that we are all vaguely supposed to pursue. This concealment of objects and methods (which is equally characteristic of both the codes cited by Professor Hunter) is undoubtedly moral practice. How moral theory, finding such practice within its field of study, would proceed to describe it has perhaps been sufficiently indicated.

RESEARCHES AND REPORTS.

SOME IMPRESSIONS OF THE NINTH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF PSYCHOLOGY.

By DR. I. L. G. SUTHERLAND,
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THE Ninth International Congress of Psychology was held at Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut, from September 1 to September 7, 1929. This is the first occasion on which an International Psychology Congress has been held in the United States. As Professor Eduard Claparède, Geneva, Secretary of the International Committee, exclaimed at the opening of the Congress, "At last we are in America!" From the point of view of numbers the Congress was remarkable. Over one thousand persons were present and more than four hundred and fifty papers were contributed: a contrast, as Professor Claparède remarked, to the "*Congrès intime*" at Oxford in 1923 which some two hundred psychologists attended. Of the membership approximately two hundred were from foreign countries and eight hundred from the United States. The fact that the International Congress of Physiology was held at Boston just prior to the Psychology Congress attracted from Europe many distinguished scientists interested in both fields, notably I. P. Pavlov of Russia. It was unfortunate, however, that the dates of the Congress coincided with those of the meeting of the British Association in South Africa. This prevented many leading British psychologists from being present. To list the countries represented is like naming the countries of the world. Among them were Great Britain, Germany, France, Switzerland, Holland, Belgium, Spain, Italy, Austria, Norway, Sweden, U.S.S.R. (Russia), Denmark, Poland, India, China, Japan, Egypt, Palestine, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Mexico and Argentine. Among the well-known psychologists present were Claparède, Köhler, Michotte, Piéron, Spearman, Kofika, Drever, Stern, Decroly, Schiller, Lipmann, McDougall, Cattell, Thronthike, Terman, Piaget and Jastrow. Just as the Congress commenced news was received of the death of Professor Morton Prince, and suitable reference was made to his distinguished career and his contributions to modern psychology. At the moment, throughout America, intense public interest was being taken in the successful world flight of the German zeppelin, and its commander, Dr. Eckener, was invited to attend the Congress. Dr. Eckener, it was disclosed, had been a student under Wundt at Leipzig and had taken his doctorate for a thesis on "Sensations of Touch".

Foreign members of the Congress were welcomed and very hospitably entertained by Princeton and Columbia Universities before the actual sessions of the Congress began. A delightful and interesting day was spent at Princeton on Friday August 30. After a welcome by the President of the University, opportunity was given to inspect the very well-equipped psychological laboratory, Professor Langfeld explaining, in several languages, the pieces of research in progress. Professor Warren entertained the party to lunch at his house, and in the afternoon acted as guide on a tour of places of interest at the University. Princeton University possesses some beautiful buildings and its streets are lined with many lovely trees. On return to New York, members of the party were met at Pennsylvania Station by representatives of Columbia University, conveyed to the University and assigned rooms at Furnald Hall. Excellent arrangements had been made by Professor Poffenberger and others for the Saturday. Visits were made, according to the interests of members, to one or more of the following New York institutions: Columbia University Medical Center, the Psychiatric Department of Bellevue Hospital, the Children's Hospital, Randall's Island (a municipal institution for the study and care of feeble-minded and problem

children), the Vocational Adjustment Bureau, the Educational Clinic of the College of the City of New York, and an industrial excursion to the headquarters of the Third Avenue Railroad Company where a demonstration was given of the vocational tests used for the selection of motormen. In addition, the psychological laboratories of Columbia University—experimental, animal, and research—were open for inspection. Here, as at other Universities, one was impressed by the size and equipment and activity of the psychology departments, by the energetic prosecution of experimental research, and by the amount of money available. Saturday afternoon was given up to a comprehensive sight-seeing bus trip around New York, with tea served at New York University on University Heights, overlooking the Hudson. But it must be confessed that it was the Saturday evening excursion to the Roxy, the vast motion-picture cathedral on Broadway, which seemed most to excite the distinguished foreign psychologists, who showed themselves by no means unresponsive to the thrilling character of life in New York. As a New Haven newspaper headline subsequently had it: "Excursions Show Psychologists Just People." Columbia University very conveniently arranged for the transport of the foreign delegates to New Haven, which was reached on Sunday noon. The Congress arrangements had been made with characteristic American efficiency. The organization of such a large gathering was a considerable task, which had been most excellently carried out by the American National Committee. The foreign members were accommodated in the very beautiful Memorial Quadrangle at Yale University, and meals for the whole Congress were served on the cafeteria plan in the University dining hall.

The opening of the Congress took place in Sprague Hall on the morning of September 2. Professor James R. Angell, President of Yale University and Vice-President of the Congress, welcomed the delegates and spoke of the value of friendly co-operation between the scientists of various nations. Professor J. McKeen Cattell, of New York, President of the Congress, then gave his presidential address on "Psychology in America". (Professor Cattell's first gesture on rising to speak was to remove his coat and to suggest that others do the same. The mercury on that day, as the papers said, climbed to 94 and broke all records. Owing to the abnormally hot weather, the Congress throughout was largely in shirt-sleeves.) Before reviewing the progress of psychology in the United States during the past forty years, Professor Cattell spoke optimistically and prophetically of the rôle of science in furthering international co-operation and understanding and of the significance of psychology for human welfare, and said in part: "When in the fullness of time there is a family of the nations when each will give according to its ability and receive according to its needs, when war among them will be as absurd as it would now be for members of this Congress to begin murdering one another, this will be due in no small measure to co-operation among scientific men in their common stock. And it may be that psychology, the child among the sciences, and the United States, the child among the nations, shall lead them. . . . It is the object of psychology to describe, to understand and to control human conduct. . . . Psychology not less than other sciences, perhaps more than any one of them, is concerned with problems of human welfare. The nation, the family, schools, churches, courts, prisons, armies and navies—these are all institutions which aim by emotional and rule-of-thumb methods to alter individuals and to control their behaviour. When we have knowledge and understanding concerning institutions and individuals and learn how to apply knowledge and understanding for their betterment, it will be a product of a science of psychology." In reviewing American psychology, Professor Cattell claimed that it had led the way in the development of objective methods of study and in the measurement of individual differences. Professor Claparède replied to Professor Angell's welcome and spoke of earlier Congresses of Psychology, making also a plea for an international language for scientists.

Representing the United States Government, Dr. W. J. Cooper, Federal Commissioner for Education, also welcomed the foreign delegates.

The plan of the Congress provided for parallel morning sessions, usually three each day, with some six papers of twenty minutes length, and a much larger number of informal symposia in the afternoons, contributions to which were limited to eight minutes. Questions and discussion followed the reading of the papers in both cases. Papers for the morning sessions were grouped under the following heads: Theory and history of psychology, comparative psychology, educational psychology, methodology and technique, social psychology, child development, physiological psychology, psychology of personality, abnormal and clinical psychology, experimental psychology and psychology of industry and personnel. In addition to these same general headings, the informal symposia, with sometimes over twenty making contributions, covered such topics as: Animal behaviour, applications of psychology to methods of teaching, effects of drugs, maladjustments, the psychogalvanic reflex, theoretical psychology, general intelligence, legal psychology, meaning and symbolism, psycho-physics, abnormal psychology, eye movements, laboratory and teaching devices, memory and learning, psychology of music, race differences, nature of G, physiological psychology, statistical method, sleep, æsthetics, mental tests, motivation, reflexes, religious psychology, sensation and perception. Truly a stupendous programme, and one reflecting interestingly the very great activity in psychological investigation at the present day, also the somewhat chaotic and unco-ordinated condition of the science. Members moved about freely from meeting to meeting to hear such papers as they thought would prove interesting. Naturally the significance of papers varied considerably, and some seemed of such slight value that one felt that more consideration might have been given to the selection of papers and their number reduced. The official languages of the Congress were English, French, German and Italian, but with the membership so overwhelmingly English-speaking, foreign members in a great many cases spoke in English, sometimes perhaps unwisely.

Two lectures open to the public were delivered each evening by distinguished members of the Congress. These were of special interest and significance. Professor I. P. Pavlov, world-famous for his work on conditioned reflexes, lectured on "A Brief Sketch of the Highest Nervous Activity". Professor Pavlov spoke in Russian, his lecture being interpreted by one of his co-workers, Dr. G. V. Anrep. In this lecture Pavlov gave a general account of the conclusions to which nearly thirty years of experimental work on the nervous system have led him. Among the many interesting personalities of the Congress, Pavlov was outstanding, lecturing, for all his eighty years, with an astonishing fire and vigour. On the same evening Professor W. Köhler lectured on "Some Problems of Gestalt Psychology". Though *Gestalt-Theorie* was freely referred to in papers in various sections of the Congress, one was disappointed at not hearing of the application of the concept of *Gestalt* to somewhat wider fields than those with which one was already familiar, particularly to problems of feeling and emotion. Other evening lectures were by Professor A. Michotte, Louvain, on "*Quelques aspects de la psychologie de la perception négligés dans les recherches expérimentales*", and by Professor Henri Piéron, Paris, on "*Douleur et sensation*"—an interesting argument against the accepted view that pain is a sensory experience. The address of the President of the American Psychological Association, Professor K. S. Lashley, was also delivered at one of the evening meetings of the Congress. Professor Lashley gave a brilliant and significant lecture on "Basic Neural Mechanisms in Behaviour". His experimental work and conclusions reflected interestingly on those of Professor Pavlov, and as one well-known British psychologist remarked on leaving the meeting: "That should be the end of Behaviorism in America." At subsequent evening meetings Professor William Stern, Hamburg, lectured on "*Die Wissenschaft von der Menschlichen Person*", and Professor M. Ponzio,

Turin, on "*Le dynamisme psychique dans les recherches de l'école de psychologie de Turin*". The last two evening lectures were given by Professor E. L. Thorndike on "Fundamental Factors in Learning", and by Professor Carl Spearman, London. Professor Spearman, speaking on "Creative Mind", while admitting that psychology was as yet unable to give an adequate account of creativeness, claimed that creative mind was as active in science as in the field of the fine arts. Using creativeness in a very wide sense, Professor Spearman said that a case may be made out that play, imitation, and even sympathy fall largely within its scope. More patently it comprehends all initiative in behaviour; nor can its pertinence be denied to hallucinations, illusions, and, in particular, dreams. Indeed, we can make it responsible for the loftiest flights, those of the metaphysicians, including the hardy ones who claim to be talking "common sense".

Of the papers delivered at the various sessions it is possible to mention only a few of the limited number one was able to sustain and hear. At the session on the theory and history of psychology, Professor Joseph Jastrow, a particularly lively and refreshing speaker and a most active member of the Congress, bravely tackled a problem of which the Congress itself made one rather painfully conscious. Speaking on "The Conflict of the Psychologies", he said that while the acceptance of psychology in the confederation of the sciences is established, an internal warfare continues which in historical circumstance is unfortunate and in professional responsibility scandalous. There is no parallel elsewhere. Psychologists are able to agree neither on fundamental concepts nor on direction of progress. The state of affairs, however, is not without justification. When the object of the research involves the researcher himself, cross-lights are inevitable. Professor Jastrow then hopefully reduced the "psychologies" to one another and marked out common ground. The session on physiological psychology provided an interesting meeting when Professor Wm. McDougall presented a "Second Report on a Lamarckian Experiment". Professor McDougall has been continuing his experiment on facility in learning a task in successive generations of white rats (reported some time ago in the *British Journal of Psychology*), and now claims further proof of the inheritance of acquired characters. Professor Cattell actively assailed the McDougall experiment and a lively discussion followed, most of those present appearing to regard McDougall's conclusions as too good to be true, but no one being quite able to point to where the fallacy lay. The symposium on meaning and symbolism led to an interesting exchange of views, Dr. James Drever's claim that meaning is affective being actively opposed from the intellectualist standpoint. Dr. F. C. S. Schiller, while gratified to find psychologists at last discussing meaning, made a plea for more consideration being given to this important problem. At the symposium on race differences, Professor H. H. Long, in analyzing intelligence test results from approximately ten thousand negro children, made an important point when he emphasized the significance of the social background in mental development and proceeded to give a vivid account of the mental and social background of the negro child. Professor G. A. Jaederholm, Sweden, who has been working in America for a year or more, gave to the session on social psychology a particularly delightful account of his methods of observing the social behaviour of a group of children. At the same meeting Professor D. Katz, Rostock, with a wealth of gesture of his own, spoke interestingly on "*Gebärdensprache und Entwicklungspsychologie*". The symposium on æsthetics was disappointing and produced little of value. A contribution from the *Gestalt* point of view brought forth nothing save the fact that pictures are appreciated as wholes. No mention was made of the important problem of imagery and emotion in æsthetic creation and appreciation. Dr. Wilhelm Wirth, Leipzig, however, made an unusually interesting contribution in an illustrated paper on "*Eine Welt jugendlicher Bildkunst*". He told of the imaginative world which two boys

created on the planet Saturn, the boys, he subsequently disclosed, having been his brother and himself.

Soviet Russia was well represented at the Congress, and one was glad to hear something, at any rate, trustworthy about Russia. Psychological studies are being actively pursued, and one gathered that, in spite of his immense authority, there are other points of view in Russian psychology than that of Professor Pavlov, and that the psychologists of the State Institute for Experimental Psychology protest against his complete mechanization of human behaviour. One was interested to note throughout the Congress the extent to which Freudianism has been accepted by psychologists and has influenced their science. At the Oxford Congress of 1923 Freudian theories were criticized and defended as such. At Yale the fundamental Freudian conceptions were for the most part incorporated and assumed.

By far the largest number of contributions to the Congress were made by American psychologists, most of whom appeared to be interested in such problems as experimentation on animal behaviour (squabs, chicks, kittens, monkeys, sheep, rats, guinea-pigs, and goldfish were reported upon), maladjustments in childhood and adult life and problems of delinquency, and mental tests and problems of learning. Quite extensive use was made of the cinema to illustrate papers and films were shown on such varied subjects as conditioned reflexes in the sheep, by Professor Liddell, social reactions of the young child, by Professor Decroly, Brussels, and by Professor Grunbaum, Amsterdam, to illustrate his "*Beitrag zur Revision der Apraxiefrage*". Professor Decroly's film was particularly interesting, contrasting the behaviour of the normal and the defective child in relation to other children and to animals. In addition, a screening was arranged in a New Haven theatre of Professor Pavlov's famous film, "*Mechanics of the Brain*". This film showed in a simple and very skilful manner Pavlov's work on reflexes and their conditioning in the dog. The experiments on a boy which were also shown made one feel strongly the limitations of the concept of the reflex as the sole explanation of human behaviour. The film also illustrated phases in the development of child behaviour. Throughout the Congress there was on display for inspection an extensive range of psychological apparatus, also of new books.

Towards the end of the Congress, after listening to many papers and finding it more and more difficult to take quite seriously all that passes for psychological science, one could not help rather enjoying an ironical editorial in a New York paper headed "Professor's Wisdom". Though a well-known American psychologist is mentioned, what is said could quite well apply to some psychologists of other countries. "The psychologists are a wise crew", said the *Herald Tribune*, "but they would be more highly regarded by the vulgar public if they did not have such a solemn habit of proclaiming, with columns and columns and columns of statistics to prove the point, things which every normal human being learned in grammar school days. Professor Lewis M. Terman has assured the Ninth International Congress of Psychology that some men are rather feminine and some women rather masculine. . . . It took four years, apparently, for Mr. Terman to reach this impregnable conclusion. All the students of Stanford University seem to have been used as experimental guinea-pigs, and their and other's answers, sorted and filed and tabulated and counter-tabulated, yielded the professorial results. Men's wives influence them, the Professor says; they become more feminine. . . . Football players as a group, he discovered, are more masculine than priests. Well, well!" Which leads one to mention that the newspapers gave a surprising amount of space to the proceedings of the "Psychfest", as they mostly called the Congress. In America psychology is "news", the public is interested and the results are often amusing. Reports of the proceedings of the Congress appeared under such snappy headlines as: "1000 Attend Psychology Meet at Yale"; "Subconscious Undependable, says Roback"; "Finds Swearing Among Girls is Bad Sign"; "Female's Rage Deadlier".

One psychologist having defined personality as "an individual's social stimulus value", a newspaper gave his contribution a Hollywood interpretation: "Scientists Seeking Means to Measure or Weigh 'It'": "A search for a yardstick for 'It'—that thing which John Gilbert and Clara Bow are all broken out with and which, alas, many college professors seem to lack—began today at the great gathering of more than 1000 scientists at the Ninth International Psychology Congress." Some contributions to the Congress, it must be confessed, lent themselves rather readily to such lively interpretations.

An afternoon reception to members of the Congress was given by the President of Yale University, Professor Angell, at the School of the Fine Arts, and this was followed by the Congress banquet. These were the only social functions, save for the informal "smokers" each evening. At the business meeting which concluded the Congress, Professor Carl Spearman extended the thanks of the foreign delegation to Yale University for its splendid hospitality, and the new International Committee was set up. Included on it was Professor T. A. Hunter, representing Australasia. It was agreed that the next Congress be held in Copenhagen in 1932, Professor Rubin extending the invitation on behalf of his country, and Professor Harald Høffding being elected President of the Danish Congress. Subsequent to the Congress foreign members made excursions to Harvard and Clark Universities and to Wellesley College and Smith College, and were further hospitably entertained.

One recalls the Congress as a time of interesting human contacts in a beautiful setting, much stimulating and amusing talk, and heat and humidity and ice water—all against the background of the intensely interesting and exhilarating American scene.

REVIEWS.

AN OUTLINE OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY. By J. R. Kantor. Chicago: The Follett Publishing Co. 1929. Price: 2.40 dollars.

Is there a science that can in any true sense be called social psychology? To this question very different answers have been given. Some consider social psychology but an addendum to individual psychology; others that the phenomena with which the social psychologist deals fall within the field of sociology; others, again, affirm that sociology is largely applied psychology. Many hold that no real line of division can be drawn between individual and social psychology. In the book under review, Professor Kantor criticizes a number of conceptions of social psychology, *e.g.*, "as the study of mob or crowd phenomena", "as the study of behaviour in groups", "as the study of socialization". The author proposes to sweep these difficulties aside, to define psychology behaviouristically as "the study of responses to stimuli", to consider social psychology as "a distinct field within the general psychological domain" and to find the differentia of this field in "cultural behaviour".

Thus the author writes:

"Cultural behavior is differentiated from non-cultural responses primarily upon the basis of the stimuli to which the reactions are performed. That is, cultural behavior consists of responses to institutions. The institutional stimuli elicit from various persons a distinct mode of common behavior. Cultural or social psychology, therefore, is the study of the individual as he develops cultural behavior equipment. This equipment is composed of responses to stimuli that are unlike those investigated in other branches of psychology. Such cultural reactions, along with their corresponding institutional stimuli, form the body of facts of our present study." (p. 2).

"Social psychology then we confidently assert is distinct from the other human sciences. Not only are its data unique but its methods and results are quite disparate." (p. 20).

"Only individuals inclined toward music or baseball are available for the performance of musical or baseball crowd behavior. Mob or crowd action, therefore, consists merely of the massing of the private behavior of persons constituting the crowd or group and not of genuine cultural conduct." (p. 41).

If these assumptions are allowed, the scope and viewpoint are determined in the introductory chapters and the rest of the work falls into four parts :

Part 1: The perspectives of social psychology—the biological implications for cultural conduct; the anthropic background of cultural behavior; cultural behavior as psychological phenomena.

Part 2: The data of social psychology—the nature of social responses; the nature of institutions or cultural stimuli; culturalization; cultural personality as human nature; the mechanism of institutional development.

Part 3: Relativity of individuals and psychological collectivities—the characteristics of behavior groups; personality and conduct restrictions of cultural behavior.

Part 4: Social psychological phenomena as components of human situations—dealing with the scientific, linguistic, æsthetic, religious, political, and educational situations.

Professor Kantor gives six types of responses to stimuli: universal basic, suprabasic, contingent, idiosyncratic, social or cultural. It is with the last only that social psychology deals. For the details of this classification the author refers us to his "Principles of Psychology", but it is difficult to see that this new scheme is any real advance on the older classifications, while the new terms place on author and reader alike heavier burdens of explanation.

It does not seem possible to separate, as the author attempts to do, the cultural life of an individual from the other aspects of personality. Attempts to draw hard and fast lines of this type have wrought untold harm in other spheres, such as Ethics, and will injure psychology if they persist. The author recognizes the difficulty, for he writes (p. 65): "When an individual performs a cultural response he is at the same time acting as a biological organism, a general psychological being, and as a unit in an anthropological system. . . . Only by observing these methodological requirements is it possible to confine ourselves to what is essentially 'our subject.'"

But is there any methodology that will enable us to disentangle these aspects of personality? We think not. Much of the work of this book is an attempt to create distinctions by the development of a new terminology.

A further criticism seems necessary. Some American writers seem to be developing a new form of language—one that in many cases is a hindrance to clearness in thinking. Kantor's "Social Psychology" and James's "Principles of Psychology" present the most marked contrast in this respect. One may differ from James, but one can hardly fail to understand what the ideas are that he is anxious to express. We cannot say this for the book under review. Again and again we found it very difficult indeed to grasp the meaning of the language used. With one or two illustrations of this difficulty we conclude this review :

"The psychological organism therefore does not interact with sheer environmental objects as the biological organism does. That is to say, what we call stimuli in biology are bare qualities or conditions (irritants) of objects which functionate structures." (p. 79).

"A pragmatic principle of considerable service here is the degree of connection of the anthropic elements with sheer human ecological conditions." (p. 110).

"When a moral trend runs counter to a commercial tradition the chances are that a new moral sentiment will arise in a given civilizational center." (p. 147).

"A primary consideration here for the detailed student of anthropic phenomena is the fact that environmental features in their essential details must be present to serve as stimuli for the activities of the individual members of the collectivities." (p. 152).

"Any thing, condition, person, or situation endowed with stimulatory qualities which serve as common stimuli, is an institution." (p. 240).

T. A. HUNTER.

UNE PSYCHOLOGIE OBJECTIVE EST-ELLE POSSIBLE? By
E. Augier. 290 pp. Paris: Félix Alcan. 1928. Price: 30 francs.

Since the title of this book takes the form of a question, the reader is justified in expecting that the book itself will constitute a fairly definite answer, either negative or affirmative. Augier answers unhesitatingly that an objective psychology is possible; moreover, he makes out an admirable case. His thesis is that academic psychology is in a bad way mainly because academic psychology regards as elementary and unanalysable such things as sensations and images which, in point of fact, are neither elementary nor unanalysable. He urges those of us who pretend to be psychologists to give some consideration to "brute facts", to make our subject a continuation of the physical sciences, notably of physiology, and to refuse to toy any longer with terms and concepts without attempting to break them up into objective elements.

But Augier does not annoy us, as do the more extreme behaviourists, by bidding us to be no longer students of the mind and to throw overboard the only genuine psychological method, namely, introspection. Rather does he urge us to use it more fully, above all to use it objectively. Indeed, this "internal sense" is, according to Augier, the key which will admit us to the realm of objective psychology. We are urged to pay the closest possible attention to our actions as they occur, and to hearken to the information which, even while those actions are taking place, will be afforded by the "internal sense". This information will, we are assured, fit in with and be amplified by our increasing insight into the physical sciences. For example, we are told that, if we refuse to credit the academic psychologist who tells us that sensation is unanalysable, our "internal sense" will furnish us with very precious knowledge concerning it. But we must discard in large measure the ordinary academic ways of thinking and of speaking. For example, we must not say—"I feel a burning in the tips of my fingers"; but rather—"the organs for the reception of heat at the extremities of my fingers are strongly stimulated, and the excitement is spreading through the neuronic network to my nerve centres". Again, we must not say—"I am afraid"; but rather—"a nervous impulse has been set up in the internal neurons which are associated with the reflexes of flight, but the impulse is being arrested before it reaches the motor nerves". Augier's contention is that, after the psychologist has trained his "internal sense" and has for some time thought objectively, such ways of thinking and of speaking as are suggested above are invested with much fuller meaning. I can well imagine the reader of this review muttering to himself—"They would need to be".

It is to be feared that, in order to write an adequate review of this book, certainly in order to appreciate fully what Augier has to say, one would need to practise his method over a considerable period. But if I am unable to state any very convincing grounds for my belief, I can at least record my conviction that the author succeeds in making a very plausible objective explanation of many of the phenomena in which the psychologist is interested,

and that he asks his readers to accept many fewer dubious hypotheses than the average physiological psychologist.

Further, he does not demand that we abandon altogether our academic psychology. Of the formulæ of that excellent mental discipline he writes that "in many cases they are extremely useful. But in others, they lack the precision and the certainty that are desirable". Probably none of us would wish to question this moderate statement.

C. R. McRAE.

THE FUNDAMENTALS OF HUMAN MOTIVATION. By Leonard T. Troland. Macmillan & Co., London. 1928. Pp. 520. 21s. net.

Books as comprehensive as the one at present under review should have an important preface. Two quotations taken from Professor Troland's introductory remarks may therefore be excused. After agreeing with Morton Prince that "the problem of motivation is the only important one in human life", and regretting that no comprehensive treatment of human motivation has yet been attempted, Troland writes: "The following questions, discussed in the ensuing pages, should be of interest to any conscious human being: (1) our inborn tendencies to action, (2) the means by which we learn, (3) the basis of 'pleasure and pain' and the part they play in learning, (4) the foundations of 'happiness' in general, (5) the nature and operation of 'instincts' such as that of sex, (6) the physiological meaning of the Freudian 'complex', (7) the nature and foundations of emotional experience, (8) the explanation of typical modern interests—automobiles, radio, and the like, (9) suggestions towards a scientific treatment of the problems of ethics. In dealing with these varied subjects, I have endeavoured to summarize all significant available facts and theories, and yet to combine them into a doctrine which has some new aspects, and gives unity to a discussion which might otherwise be confusing."

The foregoing quotation should convey some conception of the scope of the work. As for the method adopted: "No pretence is made that this book is a popular discussion. It purports, rather, to be a scientific analysis of the motivational problem."

It will be obvious that Professor Troland is a man of courage; that he set himself, and incidentally his reviewers, a colossal task. But whereas the author has performed his part, and excellently, this reviewer at least simply can not.

Adequately to review this work, the present writer would want much more time in which to think and much more space whereon to write than are actually available. Conscious that the excuse has been advanced before, and only too often, he can only repeat it, asserting that on this occasion it is true. Consider again what Troland has attempted to do. Remember that he is determined to leave out of account precisely nothing. Room and consideration must be found for all comers—for psycho-analysts of all shades of opinion, for behaviourists of all varieties, confessed, unconfessed and unconscious, for Sherrington, with his masterly analysis of neuro-muscular action, and all the other physiologists, for all those who believe in, and quarrel among themselves about, a purposive or "hormic" psychology, and for the great host of orthodox academic psychologists. Not only are all these to be heard, but, when all the evidence is in, all their seemingly so divergent views are to be harmonized. This task Troland attempts at a time when, for example, the people who believe in "instincts" can find little or no agreement among themselves and cannot be persuaded to do other than laugh at the "puerilities" of behaviourists and the "narrowness" of physiologists. I think I wrote above that Professor Troland is a man of courage.

Anyone who, like the present writer, has been inclined to believe in an "instinct" psychology, and to regard McDougall as, in general, a fairly

reliable guide, is asked by Troland to make radical changes in his ways of thinking. McDougall's conception of instincts as "semi-transcendental 'hormic' forces which are mental rather than physical in character" is roundly condemned. It is, of course, possible to reply that, whether or no McDougall's views on instinct are fundamentally sound, they "work" in practice. Whether there are any such forces or not, it helps immeasurably, in dealing with normal school children, or with delinquents, or with the unstable, to regard the individuals as acting under the impulse of such forces as curiosity, self-assertion, pugnacity, and the rest. For practical purposes the instinct theory is true. Children, and adults, do tend to examine the novel, to attempt to rise superior to the occasion, to show anger when thwarted. But this measure of truth does not content Troland. He wants to know whether there actually are such inborn tendencies as McDougall lists, and calls "instincts", and he finds that there are not.

He first attacks the problem from the physiological standpoint. He divides receptors into three classes—"nociceptors", such as the nerve-endings for pain and hunger, "beneceptors", such as the nerve-endings stimulated when sugar melts on the tongue, and "neutroceptors", such as the nerve-endings in the eye and ear, called "neutroceptors" because they receive more or less indiscriminately both pleasant and unpleasant messages. A man's eye reveals to him the presence of his deadliest enemy as well as that of his lady-love. Troland then enunciates the following law of nervous action: "Nociception is accompanied by a decreasing of the conductance of operating cortical adjustors, whereas beneception is accompanied by the increasing of the conductance of operating cortical adjustors."

This is "the law of retroflex action", and in terms of "retroflexes" and "conditioned retroflexes" the author proceeds to explain not only all so-called "instincts", but also all "complexes" and "sentiments", and all learning of every kind. Thus, instead of postulating a "food-seeking instinct", for example, Troland would have it that the tendency to seek and to devour food is acquired. Rather than to believe that there are lines of low resistance and ready conduction laid down, as it were, from birth, in the nervous system, he holds that increased conductance of cortical centres results from the stimulation of beneceptors, in accordance with the law of retroflex action. He illustrates his theory by a detailed consideration of sexual motivation, heaping much ridicule upon the view that McDougall is obliged to adopt, namely, that the male of the species has an inborn tendency to perceive and to be interested in the feminine form.

Having developed at length his theory of retroflex action—Troland covers some 254 solid pages before he begins to mention "mind" or "consciousness"—the author has to establish a relationship between physiological processes and consciousness. Briefly, he formulates a "psychological hedonism of the past". Affective intensity is said to be proportional to retroflex action; that is, the action of beneceptors is associated with pleasantness, that of nociceptors with unpleasantness, and an individual's response to any situation is dependent upon the amount of affection which has been experienced in the past in connection with similar situations. Since this doctrine does not presuppose the activity of memory, but finds sufficient basis in the physiological theory of retroflex action, Troland claims that it avoids the weaknesses inherent in hedonistic doctrines heretofore formulated.

Through the application of these principles, the author explains in detail typical emotional experiences, the types and characteristics of complexes, sexual motivation, typical modern interests, the make-up of personality, and a host of allied problems. Finally—and this is interesting in view of the fact that he makes the fullest use of all available physiological data—he confesses the belief that consciousness and matter are not in fact separate systems, but that "the fundamentally real system is that of consciousness or experience alone".

There is a story which concerns a man who, after owing the money for five years, attempted to return half-a-crown to an acquaintance. "Keep

it", said the creditor, "I can't change my opinion of you for half-a-crown." Any psychologist who, like that creditor, is wedded to his opinions, should not open Troland's book—for no matter what those opinions are, they will be shaken. This is surely to say that the book is distinctly out of, and above, the ordinary.

C. R. McRAE.

FACTORS IN THE MAKING OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION. By E. H. Burgmann, M.A., Th.Soc. The St. John's College Press. Pp. 46.

This little book consists of five biblical studies addressed to the Summer School of the Australian Board of Missions. These students were very well served and very fortunate—for Mr. Burgmann has a curiously vital way of talking about things that matter.

The main idea of the chapters is really a study in the Social Interpretation of Religion. The author takes in succession the Desert, the City, the Temple, the Well, and the Hill, and tries to show the significance of these things in the evolution of religion in general and of the Christian Religion in particular. This does not mean that Mr. Burgmann finds in Geography the only key to unlock the puzzle of religious development. He is wiser than to go looking for "only keys". But he does show us how environment has very directly affected man's religious ideas.

The Desert, with its fierce sun and clear sky, suggests one God, arbitrary perhaps, but living and vivid. Whether the desert life "provided little material for the exercise of the intellect" is questionable. Leisurely travel by night under clear skies gives time for reflection—indeed almost compels it—and from the desert dwellers come the first stages of the science of Astronomy. Certainly, however, the desert life, with its attendant economic regime does not suggest individual private property.

The chapter on the City is excellently well done. The author emphasizes the positive contribution of city life to human freedom through self-imposed discipline, in contrast to the negative freedom of the desert. But is it right to say that it was impossible for a prophet to deliver his message to the world anywhere except in Jerusalem? What of Amos and Hosea?

The Temple and its story gives the author a good chance, and Mr. Burgmann takes it. Very succinctly he sketches the evolution of a vested interest (partly financial, partly political, partly intellectual) around the central structure of Jewish religion. Finally, Jesus forces the hands of the Priests. "Either they must reform themselves and their control of the Temple, or take steps to get rid of this zealous prophet." Such a decision could only go one way. The whole chapter is a skilful sketch of how the material accompaniment of religion can clog its spiritual development. As Marx said in his *Critique*: "Some forms of development (property relations) turn into fetters."

The final chapters on the Well and the Hill do not sustain the theme. They are more in the nature of interesting little Sermons on what happened in the Bible near Wells and on Hills. But they are well done.

The Episcopal Foreword to the book rather "praises it with faint dams" by remarking that a Bible class "might do worse than make this book their starting point". This reviewer thinks they might do a great deal worse. In fact, they would do very well if they found a better book for their purpose.

G. V. PORTUS.

AFRICA. By L. S. Suggate, B.Sc. London: George Harrap & Co., Ltd. 1929. Price: 6s.

Modern teachers of Geography stress above all other concepts the response of human endeavour to environmental conditions. Mr. L. S. Suggate arranges the information he has compiled about Africa with this concept

well to the fore. The first chapter is devoted to "General Physical Geography", where in a remarkably concise fashion the main features of relief, drainage and climate are not only stated, but reasons and deductions are added. The reader or student is encouraged to think out the correlation of natural forces and not merely to read and remember the facts of one area. The second chapter, under the heading "Population and Economic Regions", introduces the various Races and cultural levels to be found in Africa, and then in very brief paragraphs classifies Africa into eight Economic Regions. This is the basis of treatment of the rest of the book, each Economic Region filling a chapter of itself. The reading of those subsequent chapters carries one on in supreme interest: the treatment is orderly and clear, and the amount of information is amazing.

Very many regional maps are included, which are necessarily small, but would lend themselves excellently to blackboard reproduction; in addition, photographs, sections, simplified tables and graphs arrest the eye and assist the student to assimilate the wealth of facts presented.

In Mr. Suggate's own words, "effort has been made to suggest the historical and human background of 'Changing Africa'".

DOROTHY R. TAYLOR.

JOURNALS RECEIVED.

THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY. Edited by Professors Woodbridge, Bush and Schneider, Columbia University. Published fortnightly. 4 dollars a year.

Vol. XXVI. No. 15. July 18, 1929. Contingency and Necessity in Nature: Harold Chapman Brown. Beyond Monism and Dualism: Durant Drake. No. 16. August 1. Bishop Berkeley and His Message: George H. Mead. The Limits of the Social Sciences and Their Determinants: L. L. Bernard. No. 17. August 15. Has Russell Passed the Tortoise?: Charles W. Morris. What Does Art Express?: George B. Philips. No. 18. August 29. Intuition, Consistency, and the Excluded Middle: Ernest Nagel. No. 19. September 12. Memories and Faith: W. T. Bush. The Law of Contradiction, Its Logical Status: Albert E. Avey. No. 20. September 26. The Use and Abuse of Language: Harold Chapman Brown. The Problem of Pragmatism: Frederick J. E. Woodbridge. No. 21. October 10. On the Conscious Mind: E. A. Sanger, Jr.

PSYCHE. Edited by C. K. Ogden. Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., London. Published quarterly. Price: 5s.

No. 37. July, 1929. Work in Progress, Vocabularies, The Principles of Translation, Neologicistic Orthology: Editorial. The Theory of Fictions: Adelyne More. The Psychonic Theory of Consciousness: W. M. Marston. Inferiority of Organs: C. Dukes. Child-Study, the Modern Hobby: Mary Chadwick. The Problem of Conduct: E. S. Bennett. The Talkie and Its Creators: H. S. Hatfield.

PHILOSOPHISCHER WELTANZEIGER. Edited by Paul Feldkeller. Schönwalde (Niederbarnim) bei Berlin. Published bi-monthly. Price: 3 marks a year, or 50 Pfg. a number.

Vol. II. No. 6. Völkerpsychologische Kontraste unter geopsychischem Gesichtspunt: Dr. Ernst Barthel. Samuel Butler: F. Die Jubiläumstagung der Kant-Gesellschaft: F. Tagung der Schopenhauer Gesellschaft: F. Eugen Dühring: F. Der R₄-Mensch: P.F.

ARCHIVES DE PSYCHOLOGIE. Edited by Ed. Claparède. Kundig, Geneva; Williams & Norgate, London. 4 numbers a year. Price: 16 francs a year.

Vol. XXI. Nos. 83-84. January-June, 1929. Le vocabulaire des enfants des Ecoles primaires de Genève: Daniel Alfred Prescott. Le vocabulaire des manuels de lecture: Daniel Alfred Prescott. La valeur de l'activité de l'esprit dans la fixation des idées: Narcis Maso. Contribution à l'étude des tests de mémoires immédiate: Diana Fischler and Ida Ullert. Contribution à l'étude de quelques tests d'attention: Marie Gamsa and Anne Salkind. Contribution à l'étude des idées générales: W. Bischler.

ARCHIVIO GENERALE DI NEUROLOGIA, PSICHIATRIA E PSICOANALISI. Edited by M. Levi-Bianchini. Official Organ of the Italian Psycho-Analytic Society. Teramo, Italy. Annual subscription: 8 dollars.

Vol. X. No. 2. September, 1929. Sopra alcuni metodi d'impregnazione aurea: Altschul e De Angelis. La fabbrica dei pensieri sulla pelle dell'uomo: Dr. Giuseppe Calligaris. Sulle anomalie di carattere di alcuni grandi intellettuali: Prof. F. Del Greco. Il sinergismo morfina-solfato di magnesina: Dr. Annibale Puca. A proposito della dottrina organica della pazzia: Prof. Antonio Merlini. Bibliografie (M. Levi-Bianchini).

REVUE DE L'INSTITUT DE SOCIOLOGIE. Parc Léopold, Brussels. Published quarterly. Price: 100 francs per annum.

Vol. VIII. No. 3. July–September, 1928. La sociologie, ses méthodes et ses lois: Eugenio Rignano. Le système monétaire anglais: B. S. Chlepnier. De l' "individual" et du "social" dans le langage: Alfredo Niceforo. Chronique du mouvement scientifique: D. Warnotte. No. 4. October–December, 1928. Recherches sur l'état social original: Paul Descamps. La sociologie, ses méthodes et ses lois: Eugenio Rignano. De l' "individual" et du "social" dans le langage: Alfredo Niceforo. Vol. IX. No. 1. January–March, 1929. De la notion du fait social: René Maunier. L'écriture et la science des nombres: Raymond Lenoir. Le commerce des vins et du sel en Norvège, au moyen âge: Louis Delavaud.

REVUE NEO-SCOLASTIQUE DE PHILOSOPHIE. Published quarterly by the Société Philosophique de Louvain, 2 Place Cardinal Mercier, Louvain. Annual subscription in Belgium: 35 francs.

Vol. XXX. 2nd Series. No. 19. August, 1928. Le raisonnement en termes de faits dans la logistique russellienne: R. Feys. Les idées religieuses de Kant: F. Morelle. Prosper de Reggio Emilia: A. Pelzer. No. 20. November, 1928. A la recherche de l'unité métaphysique: N. Balthasar. La notion d'être dans la métaphysique de Jean Duns Scot: Hilaire MacDonagh. La notion du droit naturel et la pensée juridique contemporaine: J. Dabin. Bulletin d'histoire de la philosophie médiévale en occident: F. van Steenberghe. No. 21. February, 1929. Ecoles et renaissances en philosophie: M. de Wulf. Au seuil de la métaphysique—Abstraction ou intuition: J. Maréchal. La philosophie moderne exposée et critiquée: N. Balthasar. La notion d'être dans la métaphysique de Jean Duns Scot: Hilaire MacDonagh.

MEDICAL RESEARCH COUNCIL'S REPORTS. H.M. Stationery Office, London.

Report No. 56. The Effects of Monotony in Work: A Preliminary Inquiry, by S. Wyatt, J. A. Fraser and F. G. L. Stock. Price: 2s. net. Ninth Annual Report of the Industrial Health Research Board (formerly the Industrial Fatigue Research Board) to 31st December, 1928. Price: 9d. Report No. 55. A Study of Personal Qualities in Accident Proneness and Proficiency, by Eric Farmer and E. G. Chambers. Price: 3s.

MENTAL HYGIENE BULLETIN. Published by the National Committee for Mental Hygiene, 370 Seventh Avenue, New York City. Issued monthly, excepting July and August. Subscription: 1 dollar a year.

BULLETIN DE L'INSTITUT NATIONAL D'ORIENTATION PROFESSIONNELLE. A monthly review by the Institut National d'Orientation Professionnelle, Musée Pédagogique, 41 Rue Gay-Lussac, Paris.

THE AUSTRALIAN TARIFF: AN ECONOMIC ENQUIRY. By J. B. Brigden, D. B. Copland, E. C. Dyason, L. F. Giblin, C. H. Wickens. Melbourne University Press, in association with Macmillan & Co. Price: 2s. 6d.

WELFARE WORK. The Journal of the Institute of Industrial Welfare Workers. 29 Gordon Square, London, W.C. 1. Price: 5s. per annum.

THE MEDICAL JOURNAL OF AUSTRALIA. Published weekly by the Australasian Medical Publishing Co., Seamer Street, Glebe, Sydney. Price: 1s.

This Journal frequently contains articles of interest to our readers on Psychiatry and Psychological Medicine.

NOTES AND NEWS.

A branch of the Association was formed in Brisbane last June, and three meetings have been held so far. The membership is forty, and there are fifteen associate members. The following office-bearers have been elected: President—Professor Scott-Fletcher; Vice-Presidents—Professor Lowson and Rev. R. Bardon; Secretary—Mr. W. M. Kyle; Assistant Secretary—Mr. G. T. Roscoe. The papers read have been: "Psychology and Education", by Professor Scott-Fletcher; "The Basis of Ethics", by Mr. Kyle; and "Thoughts on Human Progress", by Mr. S. Castlehow.

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The following reference to this Journal is taken from the *Philosophischer Weltanzeiger* (edited by Dr. Paul Feldkeller, Berlin), Vol. II, No. 5, p. 37: 'Das britische Gesamtreich besitzt . . . drei erstklassige zugleich philosophische und psychologische Journale, nämlich, „Mind“, „The Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy“, . . . und „The Journal of Philosophical Studies.“'

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Dr. I. L. G. Sutherland, of Victoria University College, Wellington, has returned from the Ninth International Congress of Psychology held at Yale University during the first week of September. A report of the Congress by Dr. Sutherland will be found in this number.

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Mr. H. E. Field, Secretary of the Christchurch Local Branch of the Association, is now in America, having been awarded a Rockefeller Fellowship to enable him to continue his inquiries into the problem of sex education.

AUSTRALIAN INSTITUTE OF INDUSTRIAL PSYCHOLOGY.

Second Annual Report, 1928-29.

During the second year the Australian Institute of Industrial Psychology has made further progress in the application of the methods and discoveries of science to problems of industrial and business life. Moreover, the financial basis of the Institute is in a fairly healthy condition. Much is still due to the Chamber of Manufactures, which continues to afford the valuable assistance so indispensable in the early days of the Institute. Greater independence has been now achieved, however, and the Institute is maintaining its own offices and staff.

There now arises the direct need for expansion and further development, particularly in the direction of research, and for this purpose to be achieved it is necessary that an intensive campaign for financial assistance should be inaugurated.

In addition to a useful library available for members, there is a decided need for the collection of suitable reference works and periodicals for the use of Institute workers. A certain sum ought to be devoted to the first establishment, and a further annual sum voted for the maintenance of such a library.

Council for 1928-29.

President: Mr. J. L. Heyworth (Lever Bros., Ltd.).

Vice-Presidents: Mr. E. F. Keep (Hardware Merchants' Association), Mr. H. M. Macken (Retail Traders' Association).

Hon. Director: Dr. A. H. Martin, M.A. (University of Sydney).

Hon. Psychiatrist: Dr. W. S. Dawson, B.A., D.P.M., F.R.C.P. (University of Sydney).

Hon. Secretary: Mr. F. L. Edwards (Chamber of Manufactures).

Hon. Treasurer: Mr. R. J. Hawkes (Chamber of Commerce).

Members of the Council: Mrs. A. H. Austin, M.A. (Y.W.C.A.), Mr. M. F. Connelly (Vocational Guidance Bureau), Prof. Tasman Lovell, M.A., Ph.D. (University of Sydney), Mr. H. McAllister (Boy Scouts' Association of N.S.W.), Mrs. M. Muscio, M.A. (National Council of Women), Mr. A. C. Paddison (Public School Teachers' Federation), Mr. E. S. H. Ritchie (Technical Teachers' Association), Mr. L. C. Robson (Sydney Church of England Grammar School), Mr. H. B. Sevier (Chamber of Manufactures), Mr. R. H. Swainson (Y.M.C.A.), Prof. R. C. Mills, LL.D., D.Sc. (University of Sydney).

The Council met five times during the year. In addition, several meetings of the Executive were held from time to time to deal with urgent matters.

Direction.—Undoubtedly, the Institute owes its growth and progress in the main to the enthusiasm of its Hon. Director, Dr. Martin, and we express once again our thanks and appreciation of his efforts. Fortunately, it has been possible for him to meet the very heavy calls the Institute has made upon his time. It is a feature well worthy of remark, too, that he has found staunch supporters and assistants from amongst those who have graduated under him in Industrial Psychology at the Sydney University. We trust that the Institute may provide for them, through its publicity efforts, an ever-widening field of activities.

Staff.—Mr. William Bell, who has just completed his course in psychology at the Sydney University, has been appointed Assistant Psychologist. Miss N. Hales, B.A., was during the year appointed to the position of Secretary and Organizer. The Institute is fortunate in this arrangement with Miss Hales, who is also an honours graduate in psychology, since she has been able to set aside her organizing and assist in the scientific work during the seasonal periods of rush to which it would appear the vocational work will always be subject.

National Institute.—At the request of Dr. Myers, Director of the National Institute of Industrial Psychology, our own Director, Dr. A. H. Martin, has agreed to become honorary correspondent to the National Institute, and will keep the National Institute informed of our progress and work in Sydney and elsewhere in Australia.

"Industrial Efficiency."—A new monthly publication under this title, which is shortly to appear in Sydney, will contain a special section devoted to industrial psychology, and some copies will later be supplied to members.

Increase in Examination Fees.—After mature consideration the Council decided that it was quite impossible to carry on under the ruling scale of fees for Vocational Guidance examinations, and that it was found essential to re-arrange these in order that a larger income might be provided from the class of cases most frequently examined, *viz.*, those nominated by members. The fee for cases nominated by members was accordingly raised to £2 2s. This also brings the Australian Institute into line with the rates charged by the British National Institute. Since the examination is an elaborate one, lasting about three hours, dependent on expert advice, as well as demanding the individual attention of the examiner, it will readily be seen that, even so, the fees are more than reasonable.

Investigation into Secondary Educational Facilities in Business and Proposed Course in Salesmanship.—From a report by the Hon. Director, based on observation of the cases which pass through the Institute's examinations, the Council was concerned to note how few boys destined for business careers follow up any form of secondary studies systematically. It was decided to investigate the facilities existing, and to discover whether the lack was recognized.

A research letter, in the form of a questionnaire, was sent to various business men and educationists in the city. Answers received express the opinion that there is a crying need for better education in business, and draw attention to the dearth of youths who are well qualified for clerical or sales occupations. While suitable provision is provided for apprentices, nothing really constructive is offered for the post-school education of young

people engaged in sales work. The Chamber of Commerce was approached and awakened to the need for sales instruction, and has decided to co-operate with the Institute in an attempt to secure it by the establishment of a course in salesmanship. Negotiations with the Chamber of Manufactures and the Retail Traders' Association are now in progress, the outcome of which should be a united move towards the establishment of such courses.

Propaganda.—A new illustrated brochure of attractive design on the work of the Institute is in process of preparation, and will be issued at an early date.

Addresses on the work of the Institute have been delivered to the following bodies:

By the Hon. Director, Mr. Martin :

Trades and Labour Council; Printing Industry Craftsman Association; Northbridge National Association; Feminist Club; Insurance Institute; Infant Mistresses' Association; Teachers of Junior Technical Schools; Boy Scout Commissioners; Theological Students, Theological Hall, St. Andrew's College; Publicity Club of Australia; Ex-Students' Union, Rose Bay Convent; University Laboratory Assistants; Master Printers' Association; Practical Psychology Club; Campbell Street Presbyterian Men's League.

By the Hon. Secretary, Mr. F. L. Edwards :

Newcastle Rotary Club; North Sydney Rotary Club; Parramatta Rotary Club.

By the Secretary, Miss Hales :

Young Men's Christian Association; North Sydney Parents and Citizens' Association.

By the Assistant Psychologist, Mr. Bell :


Young Men's Christian Association.

Appreciation of the addresses in particular, and of the Institute in the community in general, have been invariably expressed.

Broadcasting.—By arrangement with the Chamber of Manufactures the Institute has been afforded the opportunity of broadcasting a series of five lectures on the relation of psychology to business. These are the initial series of a number of short talks on "Industrial Efficiency" designed to interest the business man.

Activities of the Institute.

The extent of the increase in the Institute's Vocational Guidance work may be gauged from the following graph, which shows a comparison between the number of cases examined each month during the first and second years :



This demonstrates the increasing recognition by parents not only of their great need for the Vocational Guidance of their youth, but also the capacity of the Institute to meet the need. It indicates, too, the tremendous possibilities for growth. The field has scarcely been touched. We have examined nearly 600 cases in two years, whereas more than 10,000 leave school annually.

Membership.—The roll of members now comprises 143 names : of these, 29 are foundation members. This shows an increase in membership of practically one hundred per cent. Seven foundation members were willing to renew the original subscription of £10 for the second year, and, since the Institute depends to a great extent upon the subscription and support of members, the action was deeply appreciated.

Experiment in a Business College.—The experiment was made in connection with methods of training. A series of lectures by Dr. Martin was given to members of the teaching staff with the object of preparing them for the new methods and affording them the means of a thorough groundwork on the psychological basis of these new methods. Both the principal and staff concur in praising the value of the work. A letter from the principal states :

“The valuable work being done by the Institute should certainly receive every encouragement for the sake of the community generally, and the advice and help given to this college in particular by Dr. Martin has been much appreciated both by the staff and myself.”

Reorganization of City Office.—This included the re-planning of the entire lay-out of the offices, together with the designing of special apparatus and methods for handling and sorting of a large mail, and also of special containers and a new filing arrangement. Special attention was paid to the best utilization of available space. A special size of table was designed, and has since proved to be perfectly satisfactory. These were arranged in such a way that the necessity for new office premises previously recognized was obviated, with a consequent saving in rent.

Departmental Store.—A thorough investigation was conducted into the methods of various departments of a large retail establishment. Recommendations in the report included a new method of handling change at the cash desks, a new lay-out for the despatch department, and utilization of space. In still another department when the recommendations have been carried out there should result a considerable saving of re-handling of goods.

Consultations.—A new branch of activities was developed this year, when the Institute was asked by several firms to take part in consultations with members of the firms' executives and to give advice in regard to problems of routing, staff, new installations, and the like. It has been suggested that this innovation might be of considerable value in the future to section managers, welfare superintendents, foremen and staff managers who might take advantage of it to talk over the particular problems in their own department.

Standardization of Office Tests.—A series of tests for clerical capacity was standardized during the year by Mr. Ralph Piddington, B.A., and are now being used in the work of the Institute.

Collection of Information.—The Institute is engaged in completing a fairly extensive survey of occupations for boys and girls, and is co-operating with other organizations in obtaining information relating to course of training apprenticeships, openings, prospects, etc. This information, in accordance with the Institute's policy of assisting clients as much as possible, will be made available to parents and others desiring details regarding any particular kind of occupation.

Industrial Selection.—Since the inception of the Institute, some thirty-five firms have used the Institute for purposes of selection and promotion of

employees. Some idea of the value of the work performed in this direction may be seen from the following letters :

General Merchandising.

A Managing Director writes :

" You have examined some twenty men, and in all cases your advice has assisted me considerably in both selecting new men from outside and re-arranging my existing staff."

Hardware Merchandising.

A General Manager writes :

" In all cases we have been pleased with the reports you have sent to us. The information and advice given in them are valuable. We have recommended the Institute to others, and shall be glad to do so any time an opportunity occurs."

Essence and Cordial Manufacturing.

A Managing Director says :

" In regard to the psychological test of present and prospective employees, we consider your methods of considerable value. It is of great advantage to be able to submit a number of applicants for a position to a test occupying a few minutes and determine with accuracy their suitability and capacity, rather than to be forced to depend on an interview and a number of more or less random questions. This applies to manual as well as to clerical or executive workers.

" Your methods were used with success in selecting a branch manager. It has also been applied to workmen. We were so impressed by the methods that we submitted the whole of our staff to tests and have noted their particular abilities, so that they may be employed to the best advantage. It is interesting to note that they gave us enthusiastic co-operation, and we feel sure that if the question is put before them in a proper manner no opposition to the tests need be feared. It certainly makes for contentment and co-operation when workpeople are employed on congenial work for which they have ability.

" As regards fatigue and motion study, we are of the opinion that the value of your investigations cannot be over-rated. In every factory some sort of an attempt is made to save labour and increase efficiency. In most cases these attempts are made more or less in the dark, and we cannot conceive that the benefits of your instructions, in a scientific and accurate basis, can be disputed. As you know, a great many alterations, based on motion study, have been made in this factory with conspicuous success. In one notable case output per person has been trebled with lessened fatigue, owing to the adoption of your principles."

Tea Merchandising.

A Manager writes :

" Your diagnosis is excellent and very accurate. It entirely confirms my own opinion after two years of observation and experience with the man who was examined. You have satisfied me as to the practical value of your idea."

Oils Distributing.

A Manager writes :

" You may encounter in your professional experience young men who can be considered for employment with ability similar to that shown by It happens that we require immediately six good men. We want men of character and ability, who can be shown prospects sufficiently good to warrant their lifetime service with our organization.

"We are entrusted with the responsibility of conducting a training school for salesmen in Australia. As rapidly as employees of ours show special ability they are appraised for employment in foreign countries.

"Our business progress depends on us getting men with imagination, ability to devise ways and means of introducing new ideas, and inducing agents to carry out these ideas. In other words, we want the executive type of salesman and sales manager.

"I value your opinion very highly, and shall be grateful if you will help us."

Precision Work in Engineering.

Messrs. Sonnerdale, Ltd., write:

"We have employed the Institute whenever it was possible to do so for the purpose of selecting our apprentices. We are happy to report that since then we have never had a bad apprentice. Your examinations have borne fruit, and we have secured some remarkably good ones. It is particularly encouraging to us to know that some of the lads we sent you, and whom you rejected as unsuitable for engineering, have been suitably placed in other trades which you recommended, where ultimately they will be much happier and more useful."
